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ORIGINALISM AND THE ARISTOTELIAN 
TRADITION:  VIRTUE’S HOME IN ORIGINALISM 
Lee J. Strang* 
 
A concept fundamental to philosophy—virtue—is, with a few notable 
exceptions, absent from scholarship on constitutional interpretation 
generally, and on originalism in particular.  Furthermore, common 
perceptions of both virtue ethics and originalism have prevented 
exploration of how incorporating virtue ethics’ insights may make 
originalism a better theory of constitutional interpretation.  This Article fills 
that void by explaining the many ways in which concepts from virtue ethics 
are compatible with an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation.  
More importantly, I show that originalism is more normatively attractive 
and descriptively accurate when it incorporates virtue ethics’ insights.  
  Originalism must articulate virtue’s role in constitutional interpretation 
for a number of reasons.  First, incorporating the concept of virtue into 
originalism will give it greater explanatory power.  For example, adding 
the concept of virtue to the mix helps originalism embrace ideals such as 
judicial craftsmanship. 
Second, incorporating the concept of virtue into originalism makes 
originalism more normatively attractive.  Over the past thirty years, 
originalism has come to acknowledge judicial discretion in constitutional 
adjudication.  An originalism that incorporates the lessons of virtue ethics 
is able to preserve originalism as a viable theory of constitutional 
interpretation while, at the same time, continuing to acknowledge judicial 
discretion.  An originalism that incorporates virtue ethics’ insights gives the 
Constitution’s original meaning its due.  Simultaneously, it also gives other 
factors—such as the practical workability of legal doctrine—their due, all 
in their proper proportion.  
 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.  Thank you to the participants at 
the Loyola Constitutional Law Colloquium, the Midwest Political Science Association panel 
on Originalism, Originalists, and Natural Law, the Law and Society Association panel on 
Constitutional Law and Constitutionalism, the Ohio Legal Scholarship Workshop, especially 
John Plecnik, the Northern Kentucky University Chase College of Law workshop, the 
Indiana University School of Law–Indianapolis workshop, and the University of Toledo 
College of Law workshop for their comments and suggestions.  In particular, I wish to thank 
Lou Mulligan for his typically thoughtful comments, and Greg Gilchrist and Aaron Potter for 
their suggestions.  I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the research support for this 
Article provided by the University of Toledo College of Law.   
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INTRODUCTION 
A concept fundamental to philosophy—virtue1—is, with a few notable 
exceptions, absent from scholarship on constitutional interpretation 
generally, and originalism in particular.  On the one hand, this is surprising 
because virtue is central to the Aristotelian philosophical tradition, one of 
 
 1. Saint Thomas Aquinas’s famous definition of virtue is “a habit by which we work 
well.” ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I–II, Q. 56, art. 3 (Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947); see also ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON 
VIRTUE ETHICS 13 (1999) (“[V]irtue is . . . something that makes its possessor good; a 
virtuous person is a morally good, excellent, or admirable person who acts and reacts well, 
rightly, as she should—she gets things right.”).  I describe the concept of virtue, and related 
concepts, below. 
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the major philosophical traditions.2  On the other hand, however, this is not 
surprising given the sociological makeup of the legal academy.3  The legal 
academy—again, with notable exceptions4—is dominated by scholars at 
home in the consequentialist and deontological traditions.5  Originalist 
scholarship is no exception. 
For instance, originalists’ normative arguments for originalism come 
from the deontological and consequentialists traditions.  Professor Randy 
Barnett is representative of the former.  Barnett claims that his 
“libertarian”6 originalism is the most normatively attractive form of 
originalism because it leads to the greatest protection for natural rights.7  
Others, such as Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, have 
defended originalism based on the good consequences its adoption would 
produce.8  To date, no originalists have articulated what role, if any, virtue 
ethics’ concepts should play in a fully developed originalism.9 
 
 2. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL:  CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC 
MORALITY 5 (1993) (describing the Aristotelian tradition as the “central tradition of Western 
thought about morality and politics”); JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:  
PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 7–31 (2006) (describing the origins and 
content of the respective philosophical traditions).  
 3. See Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of 
Law, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 3–7 (Farrelly & Solum eds., 2008) (noting the paucity of 
virtue ethics in legal scholarship); see also John O. McGinnis, Matthew A. Schwartz & 
Benjamin Tisdell, The Patterns and Implications of Political Contributions by Elite Law 
School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1195 (2005) (arguing that the American legal academy is 
“liberal” as that term is understood in modern political discourse); Lee J. Strang, Originalism 
as Popular Constitutionalism?:  Theoretical Possibilities and Practical Differences, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 254 (2011) (describing the legal academy’s legal and political 
commitments). For a critical response, see Michael Vitiello, Liberal Bias in the Legal 
Academy:  Overstated and Undervalued, 77 MISS. L.J. 507 (2007).  My assumption in 
making this claim is that persons at home in modern American liberalism are less likely to 
follow the Aristotelian tradition. 
 4. The most important exception is Professor Lawrence Solum. See, e.g., Farrelly & 
Solum, supra note 3, at 3–7 (introducing the sole book-length treatment of law and virtue 
ethics). 
 5. This is exemplified by the fact that legal scholars routinely utilize concepts 
associated with the consequentialist and deontological traditions, but rarely utilize concepts 
from the Aristotelian tradition. See id. at 3–7 (describing the move toward virtue ethics in 
philosophy and proposing a similar move in law). 
 6. For critiques of Professor Barnett’s libertarian originalism, see Steven G. Calabresi, 
The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism:  A Reply to Professor Randy 
Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2005); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Rights Done Right:  A 
Critique of Libertarian Originalism, 78 UMKC L. REV. 661 (2010). 
 7. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 108–09 (2004). See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY:  
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998) (detailing the contours and justifications for Barnett’s 
conception of natural rights). 
 8. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 
98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1695 (2010) (arguing that originalism is justified because it protects the 
good consequences that arise from the Constitution’s supermajority requirements); John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
703, 802–05 (2002) (same). 
 9. Professor Lawrence Solum has written extensively on how virtue ethics, applied to 
law and legal institutions generally—such as judging—is descriptively accurate and 
normatively attractive. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 
70 BROOK. L. REV. 475, 491–520 (2005); Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. 
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Furthermore, common perceptions of both virtue ethics and originalism 
have prevented exploration of how incorporating virtue ethics’ insights may 
make originalism a better theory of constitutional interpretation.  The first 
common perception is that virtue ethics—unlike, for example, 
deontological ethics—generally does not utilize normative rules and instead 
focuses on more amorphous concepts, such as character.10  The second 
common perception is that originalism operates primarily through legal 
rules derived from the Constitution’s original meaning.11  An ethical theory 
that rejects normative rules cannot offer much to a legal theory that deals 
primarily in legal rules. 
This Article fills that void by explaining the many ways in which 
concepts from virtue ethics are, contrary to popular perception, compatible 
with an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation.  More 
importantly, I show that originalism is more normatively attractive and 
descriptively accurate when it takes on board virtue ethics’ insights. 
Originalism must articulate virtue’s role in constitutional interpretation 
for a number of reasons.  First, incorporating the concept of virtue into 
originalism will give it greater explanatory power.  For example, adding the 
concept of virtue to the mix helps originalism embrace ideals such as 
judicial craftsmanship.12  Originalism can, for instance, strive for the judge 
who is excellent at his craft. 
Second, incorporating the concept of virtue into originalism makes 
originalism more normatively attractive.  Originalism has transformed over 
the past thirty years in response to legal-realist-type criticisms.  Most 
importantly, originalism has come to acknowledge judicial discretion in 
constitutional adjudication.13  An originalism that incorporates the lessons 
of virtue ethics, however, is able to simultaneously preserve originalism as 
a viable theory of constitutional interpretation while, at the same time, 
continuing to acknowledge judicial discretion.  Virtue ethics enables 
 
JURIS. 65, 76–92 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:  A Virtue-Centered 
Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003).  Solum has also briefly noted how 
virtue ethics may impact “constitutional formalism.” See Solum, The Aretaic Turn in 
Constitutional Theory, supra, at 520–22. 
 10. See, e.g., HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 35–42 (identifying and responding to this 
view). 
 11. The primary source of this view appears to be Justice Antonin Scalia, who, in his 
scholarly writings, see, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1175 (1989), and his judicial opinions, see, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 
110, 127 n.6 (1989), has argued that implementing originalism would lead to a 
“ruleification” of constitutional law.  I explain below that Justice Scalia’s claims on this 
issue are outliers. 
 12. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 
(2003) (providing a comprehensive account of judicial character that includes the capacity 
for judicial craftsmanship); see also Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional 
Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 969, 972–74 (2011) (focusing more on judicial 
craftsmanship).  For the classic explanation of judicial craftsmanship, see KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:  DECIDING APPEALS 3–4, 214, 224–25 (1960). 
 13. Originalism’s acknowledgment of judicial discretion comes primarily in its embrace 
of constitutional construction and the preservation of some nonoriginalist precedent. See 
infra Part I.B.2. 
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originalist judges to effectively interpret and put into practice the 
Constitution’s original meaning despite and, in part, because of this judicial 
discretion.  I touched on aspects of a theory of judicial virtue in my 
previous writings14 and, in this Article, I more fully articulate an originalist 
theory of judicial virtue. 
Similarly, incorporating virtue ethics will make originalism better in 
those contexts where, even though the original meaning provides a 
determinate answer, a case places significant burdens on the judge’s 
judgment.  In this class of cases—neither the easy cases15 nor those that are 
underdeterminate16—virtue ethics provides the means to explain how 
judges can best decide. 
An originalism that incorporates virtue ethics’ insights will give the 
Constitution’s original meaning its due.  At the same time, it also gives 
other factors—such as the practical workability of legal doctrine—their due, 
all in their proper proportion.  For originalists, and for nonoriginalists who 
value the Constitution’s original meaning,17 this preserves originalism’s 
core insights, while enabling originalism’s transformation. 
This Article begins by describing originalism and, in particular, the 
transformation originalism experienced over the past thirty years.  
Originalism’s modern incarnation began in the 1970s and, at that point in its 
development, originalists primarily argued that originalism was superior to 
nonoriginalist methodologies because originalism cabined judicial 
discretion and therefore better respected democracy.  Nonoriginalists 
strongly criticized this claim and, in response, originalists transformed 
originalism in a number of ways that had, as one effect, the creation of 
analytical space for judicial discretion within originalism.  At this point, 
however, originalists have yet to explain how acknowledging this judicial 
discretion has not undermined originalism as a theory of interpretation.  
Indeed, a recent spate of criticism has utilized this line of attack.18 
Part I also shows the impasse that currently exists regarding the 
normative foundation for originalism.  Originalists have offered a stunning 
variety of normative defenses of originalism.  However, none has its roots 
in the Aristotelian tradition.  This situation parallels that of ethics when 
 
 14. Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent:  Originalism, Nonoriginalist 
Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 484–86 (2006). 
 15. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). 
 16. Underdeterminacy is when the pertinent legal materials narrow the range of possible 
legal answers but do not determine one, uniquely correct answer. See Lawrence B. Solum, 
On the Indeterminacy Crisis:  Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 
(1987). 
 17. See Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1187 
(distinguishing between “exclusive originalism” and other modes of constitutional 
interpretation that utilize history). 
 18. See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 
(2011); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009); 
Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707 
(2011). 
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Elizabeth Anscombe’s famous Modern Moral Philosophy appeared,19 
precipitating the move toward recovering virtue ethics. 
In Part II, I first describe virtue ethics, and I also explain the relationship 
between virtue ethics and the broader Aristotelian philosophical tradition, 
including the concepts of human flourishing and natural law.  Then, I 
recount virtue ethics’ recent revival.  Lastly, I describe the limited impact 
virtue ethics has had on legal scholarship generally, and constitutional 
interpretation in particular. 
In Part III, I turn to the heart of the Article:  virtue ethics’ contributions 
to originalism.  I show that originalism can incorporate virtue ethics’ 
insights even though the two appear incompatible at first blush.  Then, I 
argue that originalism should incorporate virtue ethics’ insights, and for two 
reasons:  first, doing so will make originalism more descriptively accurate; 
and second, originalism will be more normatively attractive once it 
incorporates virtue ethics’ concepts.  In particular, I detail four contexts 
where originalism becomes better:  (1) nonoriginalist precedent; (2) 
constitutional construction; (3) articulating and applying the original 
meaning; and (4) originalist precedent. 
This Article has two goals:  one more immediate and one long-term.  The 
immediate goal of this Article is to respond to recent criticism of 
originalism.  For example, Professors Thomas Colby and Peter Smith have 
argued in a series of papers that originalism is fatally compromised by its 
admission of judicial discretion.20  As Professor Colby explained, “Judicial 
constraint was [originalism’s] heart and soul—its raison d’etre,” which 
originalists have sacrificed by transforming it.21  I argue below that, by 
utilizing the conceptual tools provided by virtue ethics, this transformed 
originalism is able to retain its core insights—retaining what makes 
originalism valuable in the first place—while still accommodating judicial 
discretion. 
My second goal in writing this Article is to further my long-term 
scholarly project of applying the insights of the Aristotelian philosophical 
tradition to the United States Constitution.22  Virtue ethics is a key part of 
that tradition.  Therefore, this Article explores how virtue ethics contributes 
to an originalist understanding of constitutional interpretation.  By showing 
that virtue ethics fits well with originalism, this Article builds one more 
bridge between the Aristotelian tradition and originalism. 
 
 19. G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1 (1958). 
 20. See Colby, supra note 18, at 714; Colby & Smith, supra note 18, at 288–92; Smith, 
supra note 18, at 709. 
 21. Colby, supra note 18, at 714–15. 
 22. See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical 
Traditions Within Constitutional Interpretation:  Originalism Grounded in the Central 
Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909 (2005) (the first major 
piece of this project). 
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I.  ORIGINALISM’S RISE AND TRANSFORMATION 
A.  Originalism’s First Generation 
Originalism began as a scholarly movement in the 1970s, the aim of 
which was to criticize the Warren Court’s perceived excesses.23  Since it 
was a critical stance, originalism’s characteristics met that need.  In 
particular, originalists claimed that originalism was superior to 
nonoriginalist methodologies because it cabined judicial discretion.24  Only 
by tying judges’ constitutional interpretations to the meaning intended by 
the Framers and Ratifiers, argued then-Justice Rehnquist in 1976, would 
judges remain in their proper—limited—role.25 
The first major originalists scholars were Robert Bork and Raoul 
Berger.26  Both lauded originalism for its ability to constrain judges.  In his 
seminal piece, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
Bork—consciously acting in the Warren Court’s shadow27—argued that the 
Supreme Court’s task was to preserve the “Madisonian” compromise 
embodied in the Constitution.28  When the Supreme Court performed this 
function, it acted legitimately and, when it failed to do so, “the Court 
violate[d] the postulates of the Madisonian model that alone justifie[d] its 
power.”29 
Bork argued that the Constitution’s originally intended meaning was the 
sole proper source of Supreme Court authority.  An originalist Supreme 
Court that followed this meaning, Bork argued, “need make no fundamental 
value choices.”30  Instead, the Constitution’s originally intended meaning 
would restrain the Court:  “The judge must stick close to the text and the 
history, and their fair implications.”31 
Raoul Berger’s 1977 Government by Judiciary raised the stakes by 
arguing that much of the Warren and Burger Courts’ constitutional edifice 
 
 23. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 307–09 (2d ed. 1997) (describing his book as a challenge to “the 
‘revolutionary’ changes wrought by the Warren Court”); JONATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM 
IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS:  A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 66–67, 92–110 (2005) 
(describing originalism in this way); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1971) (stating that “the Warren Court posed the 
issue [of the Supreme Court’s proper role] in acute form”); Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 601–03 (2004) (concluding that “originalism 
was a reactive theory motivated by substantial disagreement with . . . the Warren and Burger 
Courts”). 
 24. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 204 (1980) (noting that one of the arguments made in favor of originalism is that 
it “constrains the discretion of decisionmakers”). 
 25. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 
696–97 (1976). 
 26. Then-Justice Rehnquist also wrote an early and much cited originalist article. Id. 
 27. Bork, supra note 23, at 1–2. 
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 5. 
 31. Id. at 8. 
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was illegitimate.32  Berger contended that Supreme Court judicial review 
was legitimate only when limited to enforcing the Constitution.33  
Effectuating this limited form of judicial review required the Supreme 
Court to follow the Constitution’s original intent.34  The Warren Court, 
whose case law greatly deviated from the Fourteenth Amendment’s original 
intent,35 exceeded its proper constitutional role and therefore was 
undemocratic36:  “The Constitution represents fundamental choices that 
have been made by the people, and the task of the Courts is to effectuate 
them, ‘not [to] construct new rights.’”37 
Originalism’s advocates claimed that originalism would cabin judicial 
discretion by advancing legal norms of relatively concrete breadth.  This 
resulted from the focus, described further below, on the constitutional 
provisions’ framers’ concrete intentions.38  Bork’s 1971 discussion of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, for instance, focused on whether the 
“history . . . reveal[ed] detailed choices” by the Framers.39 
The normative attractiveness of originalism’s ability to cabin judicial 
discretion was tied to a second, related claim:  judges limited by originalism 
respected democracy.40  In originalism’s infancy, its critical stance meant 
that it focused on the Warren and Burger Courts’ most controversial cases, 
which involved the Court striking down state and federal laws that 
purportedly infringed on individual rights.41  Griswold v. Connecticut,42 
and Roe v. Wade,43 were the most prominent examples of this because of 
the Court’s use of unenumerated rights,44 though the Court’s expansive 
 
 32. BERGER, supra note 23. 
 33. See id. at 4. 
 34. See id.; see also id. at 402 (defining original intent as “the meaning attached by the 
Framers to the words they employed in the Constitution”). 
 35. See id. at 3 (“The Fourteenth Amendment is the case study par excellence of . . . the 
Supreme Court’s ‘exercise of the amending power,’ its continuing revision of the 
Constitution under the guise of interpretation.”); id. at 458 (“The Court . . . has flouted the 
will of the framers and substituted an interpretation in flat contradiction of the original 
design.”). 
 36. See id. at 308 (stating that, if the Warren Court’s cases had been “authorized by the 
Constitution,” it would not have been subject to the charge of being “antidemocratic”); id. at 
460 (arguing that courts failing to respect their constitutional limits violate the “essence of a 
democratic society”); see also id. at 22–23 (arguing that “the Justices’ substitution of their 
own meaning for that of the Founders displaces the choices made by the people . . . and it 
violates the basic principle of government by consent of the governed”). 
 37. Id. at 314. 
 38. See Whittington, supra note 23, at 603. 
 39. Bork, supra note 23, at 13; see also BERGER, supra note 23, at 17–18 (describing the 
original intent of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in concrete terms); id. at 409–10 
(describing the Equal Protection Clause in rule-like terms). 
 40. See Rehnquist, supra note 25, at 696–97. 
 41. See Whittington, supra note 23, at 601–03 (providing a typically excellent review of 
the characteristics of early originalism). 
 42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see Bork, supra note 23, at 7 (describing Griswold v. 
Connecticut as “in many ways a typical decision of the Warren Court”); see also BERGER, 
supra note 23, at 286–87 (using Griswold as an example of unconstrained judging). 
 43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Whittington, supra note 23, at 603. 
 44. See Bork, supra note 23, at 11 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s substantive due 
process and “substantive equal protection” case law). 
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interpretations of more textually rooted criminal procedure rights, such as in 
Miranda v. Arizona,45 received significant criticism as well.46  Originalists 
contended that the Supreme Court acted undemocratically and hence 
illegitimately when it overturned acts of the elected branches without a 
clear warrant in the Constitution’s text or history.47  According to Bork, 
“Courts must accept any value choice the legislature makes unless it clearly 
runs contrary to a choice made in the framing of the Constitution.”48 
A third characteristic of this early conception of originalism was its focus 
on original intent.49  The original intent of a constitutional provision was 
the meaning that the provision’s framers intended it to mean.50  This facet 
of originalism was likely unconsciously adopted.  It does not appear that 
early originalists explored the reasons for and implications of adopting an 
intentionalist focus.51  For instance, in an early discussion of Brown v. 
Board of Education,52 Bork referred to the “framers’ intent” and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “legislative history” without explaining why that 
was the authoritative source of constitutional meaning.53  The tentativeness 
of this early commitment to intentionalism is shown by the quick move to 
original meaning originalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, described 
below. 
Busied with defending originalism in a hostile legal academy, originalists 
focused their attention on the basics: a normative justification for 
originalism, and how originalism was legitimate in a way the Warren and 
Burger Courts’ approach was not.  Originalists did not initially address 
subtler issues, such as originalism’s response to nonoriginalist precedent.  
Those discussions began in earnest following nonoriginalist criticism.54 
 
 45. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 46. Raoul Berger’s challenges to the Warren and Burger Courts ranged across doctrinal 
categories including voting rights and reapportionment, segregation, Section 5, equal 
protection doctrine, the incorporation doctrine, and a host of clauses in the Bill of Rights. See 
generally BERGER, supra note 23. 
 47. See Bork, supra note 23, at 6 (“[A] Court that makes rather than implements value 
choices cannot be squared with the presuppositions of a democratic society.”). 
 48. Id. at 10–11. 
 49. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 402; Whittington, supra note 23, at 603. 
 50. See BERGER, supra note 23, at 402. 
 51. My tentative hypothesis is that originalists adopted an intentionalist stance for two 
related reasons:  (1) American legal practice has and continues to be largely intentionalist; 
and (2) intentionalism is the best means of ascertaining law’s meaning (at least for enacted 
texts). 
 52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 53. See Bork, supra note 23, at 13–14. 
 54. A second impetus for greater originalist attention to originalism’s subtler 
implications was the Rehnquist Court, which did not pose as good a target for criticism and 
instead needed a more-fully fleshed-out theory to support at least some aspects of its 
jurisprudence. See Whittington, supra note 23, at 603–04. 
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B.  Originalism’s Transformation in Response 
to Legal-Realist-Type Critiques 
1.  Nonoriginalist Criticisms 
Nonoriginalists raised a host of criticisms.55  The most powerful, given 
originalism’s critical stance regarding perceived Warren Court activism, 
was that originalism did not limit judicial discretion.  Nonoriginalists 
utilized a variety of arguments to support this criticism; I will focus on four. 
First, nonoriginalists argued that it was either impossible in principle to 
ascertain the original intent of a multi-member body, such as the 
Philadelphia Convention or state ratification conventions;56 or, if possible, 
it was practically difficult such that the endeavor would regularly fail.57  
Ronald Dworkin, for instance, echoed others when he claimed that “there is 
no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered, even 
in principle.”58 
Second, nonoriginalists argued that, even when one could reliably 
ascertain the Constitution’s original intent, it frequently “ran out.”59  This 
occurs, nonoriginalists argued, when societal circumstances have changed 
to such a degree that the original intent’s application is underdeterminate.60  
The original intent also “ran out” when, due to its high level of generality, it 
did not determine the outcome of concrete cases.61  These sources of 
underdeterminacy left judges adrift and their decisions unmoored from the 
Constitution, thus fatally undermining originalism. 
Nonoriginalists further claimed that originalism was fatally flawed 
because of its commitment to overrule all or almost all nonoriginalist 
precedent.  This was a flaw because it showed that originalism was deeply 
 
 55. See Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism?:  The Evolution of Contemporary 
Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:  THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 12, 17–19 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (detailing two 
influential sources of criticism); Whittington, supra note 23, at 605–07 (describing 
nonoriginalist criticisms). 
 56. See Brest, supra note 24, at 214–15, 221–22. 
 57. See id. at 214, 220. 
 58. Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 477 (1981).  
Dworkin argued that, instead, there are different, plausible, and competing conceptions of 
constitutional intention, and a judge’s choice of which conception to follow is founded on 
substantive political morality, not a neutral fact of the world, as originalists appeared to 
assume. See id. at 477–82. 
 59. See Brest, supra note 24, at 222 (arguing that the “interpreter’s understanding of the 
original understanding may be so indeterminate as to undermine the rationale for 
originalism”). 
 60. See id. at 220 (describing the challenge to originalism posed by the requirement to 
“translate the adopters’ intentions into the present”). 
 61. See id. at 216–17 (arguing that, regarding some texts, the Framers intended to 
delegate interpretative discretion to future interpreters to apply general “concept[s]”). 
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inconsistent with existing legal practice.62  Originalism’s dramatic 
inconsistency raised the specter of legal instability.63 
Fourth, nonoriginalists charged that originalism was unacceptable 
because of the bad consequences to which its adoption would lead.64  
Nonoriginalists questioned whether even the most committed originalist 
would push originalism so far.  As Professor Paul Brest commented, 
originalism “would produce results that even a strict intentionalist would 
likely reject.”65 
2.  Originalism’s Transformation:  The Second Generation 
In response to these criticisms, originalists reformulated originalism.66  
For purposes of this Article, the most fundamental way in which 
originalism changed in response to nonoriginalist criticism was that most 
originalists acknowledged that judges have discretion in some situations.67  
Professor Keith Whittington summarized this transformation:  “By the 
1990s, originalists . . . were no longer working so clearly in the shadow of 
the Legal Realists and the fear of judicial freedom.”68  Relatedly, as 
originalists explored the process of originalist interpretation and 
adjudication, they emphasized the crucial role that judges—and especially 
their capacities such as judgment—play in legal practice. 
The originalist concession of judicial interpretative discretion was the 
result of three moves made by (most) originalists.  First, originalists moved 
away from original intent by adopting an original meaning focus for 
originalism.69  Original meaning is the conventional meaning of the 
Constitution’s text at the time of adoption.70  Although the subjective 
 
 62. See id. at 223 (“Strict originalism cannot accommodate most modern decisions under 
the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment, or the virtually plenary scope of 
congressional power under the commerce clause.”). 
 63. See id. at 231 (arguing that “strict intentionalism produces a highly unstable 
constitutional order” because the “settled constitutional understanding,” embodied in 
precedent, “is in perpetual jeopardy” of being altered by changes in historical scholarship). 
 64. See id. at 221, 229 n.96, 230; see also Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of 
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 357 (1985) (arguing that the Constitution’s meaning 
is more normatively attractive if it is “fill[ed] . . . by our notions of meaning . . . [and] by our 
notions of morals”). 
 65. Brest, supra note 24, at 221. 
 66. For an early and powerful response, from an original intent perspective, see Richard 
S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:  Three 
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). 
 67. See Paul Horwitz, Judicial Character (and Does It Matter), 26 CONST. COMMENT. 
97, 145 (2009) (book review) (“[N]o purportedly comprehensive theory of 
constitutional . . . interpretation can so perfectly constrain the judge as to render the gravity 
of the moral choices entailed in judging inconsequential.”). 
 68. Whittington, supra note 23, at 609. 
 69. See id. at 609 (“[T]he new originalism is focused less on the concrete intentions of 
the individual drafters of constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that was 
adopted.”). 
 70. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, 
supra note 7, at 89 (defining the original meaning as “the meaning [the Constitution’s 
words] had at the time they were enacted”); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
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intentions of the Constitution’s Framers and Ratifiers are evidence of the 
Constitution’s original meaning, they are not the focus of original meaning 
inquiry.71 
Original meaning originalism, with its more limited interpretative 
resources, results in relatively more cases where the Constitution’s meaning 
“runs out.”  Original meaning originalism opens up the likelihood of 
underdeterminacy72 because it limits the data73 upon which interpretation 
relies.74  Original meaning originalism relies on language conventions.  
Conventions of language usage are positive human artifacts often without 
hard edges and frequently lacking in richness.75  Using the classic “no 
vehicles in the park” example,76 the language convention for “vehicles” 
lacks both hard edges (it alone cannot determine whether a motorized 
scooter counts as a “vehicle”) and depth (it alone might preclude an 
ambulance on a life-saving mission).77 
By contrast, original intent originalism’s “data set” is richer.78  In 
addition to language conventions, an interpreter has access to information 
that can provide both more definition to a language convention’s 
boundaries and a greater thickness within those boundaries.  Most 
important, original intent originalism included within its interpretative data 
the framers’ originally expected applications, and their purposes or goals.79 
Returning to the “no vehicles in the park” hypothetical, a judge 
interpreting the term “vehicles” would know, from the ordinance’s 
legislative history, that the city council that passed the ordinance debated 
whether the ordinance would apply to scooters, and concluded that it did 
not.  This information would harden “vehicles” scope to exclude scooters.  
Similarly, a judge would have access to the fact that the city council’s 
purpose in passing the ordinance was to prevent teenagers from driving 
their cars on the park grounds and terrorizing park patrons.  This fact would 
 
INTERPRETATION:  TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35 (1999) 
(same) (citation omitted). 
 71. See Whittington, supra note 23, at 609–10. 
 72. See Solum, supra note 16, at 473 (defining underdeterminacy). 
 73. By “data,” I mean the pertinent evidence utilized by the respective originalist camps 
to articulate the Constitution’s meaning. 
 74. This claim assumes that interpreters cannot draw upon the interpretative conventions 
in place when the Constitution’s text received authority. See John O. McGinnis & Michael 
B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism:  A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case 
Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751 (2009) (articulating and advocating use 
of these conventions). 
 75. Cf. PLATO, STATESMAN 294b–c (Robin Waterfield trans., 1995) (“[Law] is like a 
stubborn, stupid person who refuses to allow the slightest deviation from or questioning of 
his own rules, even if the situation has in fact changed and it turns out to be better for 
someone to contravene these rules.”). 
 76. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125–26 (1961) (using this example). 
 77. See Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48, 51–52 (2005) (making a similar argument). 
 78. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 720 (2009) (arguing that there are more 
interpretative “sources” and “information” available to original intent originalists). 
 79. See Solum, supra note 55, at 24–27. 
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add thickness to the meaning of “vehicles” and exclude ambulances on life-
saving missions from its purview.  My claim here—that original meaning 
originalism results in greater underdeterminacy—is bolstered by original 
meaning originalists’ quick and explicit embrace of the concepts of 
vagueness and ambiguity to describe the sources of this 
underdeterminacy.80 
In practice, and for many situations, original meaning and original intent 
originalism will arrive at the same conclusion.81  However, there are 
constitutional terms and phrases for which original intent originalism will 
provide more evidence from which to draw.  Prominent original intent 
originalist, Professor Richard Kay, has likewise concluded that “public 
meaning originalism will generate more cases of constitutional 
indeterminacy than will the originalism of original intentions.”82 
Relatedly, the shift to original meaning originalism away from original 
intent foreclosed access to closure rules.  This, in turn, increased the 
likelihood and frequency of underdeterminacy.  Closure rules apply when 
an interpreter has reached a point when the interpretive data does not 
provide a right answer.83  In those situations, the closure rule will instruct 
the interpreter to choose one of the plausible (but not uniquely correct) 
candidate interpretations.84 
For example, one of the interpretative rules explicitly embraced by the 
Constitution’s Ninth and Tenth Amendments is that Congress’s powers 
should be narrowly interpreted.85  This means that, if there are two 
plausible competing interpretations of, for instance, Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority, the Supreme Court should utilize the more narrow 
interpretation.  The Supreme Court utilized this rule of construction in its 
recent anti-commandeering cases,86 New York v. United States87 and Printz 
v. United States.88 
 
 80. See Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional 
Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 631–37 (2009). 
 81. See Solum, supra note 55, at 27. 
 82. Kay, supra note 78, at 721. 
 83. The point at which a closure rule applies could vary, and scholars have not settled on 
one standard.  One possible position is that a closure rule applies when two plausible 
interpretations are in equipoise.  Another plausible position is that the rule applies only when 
there is not a clearly correct interpretation.  Undoubtedly, there are others as well. See 
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 74, at 774–75 (describing some possible closure rules in 
relation to vagueness). 
 84. Closure rules can possess varying degrees of weight.  A closure rule can dictate an 
outcome, or it could have less weight and suggest an outcome. 
 85. See Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission:  The Tenth Amendment, 
Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 
1954 (2008) (concluding that the Tenth Amendment articulates a rule of limited construction 
of federal power). 
 86. See id. at 1896 (“[A]n originalist reading of the Tenth Amendment which tracks 
Madison’s reading of the clause would place the contemporary Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence on firmer ground, both in terms of the Constitution’s text and historical 
understanding.”). 
 87. 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). 
 88. 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997). 
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Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport’s approach, labeled 
original methods originalism, explicitly embraces closure rules.89  They 
argue that, to uncover the Constitution’s meaning,90 originalists must utilize 
the interpretative rules in place when the Constitution’s text was ratified.91  
Original methods originalism’s embrace of closure rules is best exemplified 
by Professors McGinnis and Rappaport’s contention that originalism limits 
or eliminates the need to resort to constitutional construction.92  Instead of 
resorting to construction when the Constitution’s meaning is vague or 
ambiguous, they propose that the original interpretative methods prevent 
underdeterminacy.93 
Of course, there remain many originalists who have continued to 
advocate for original intent originalism.  Most of these originalists too, 
following the early nonoriginalist criticism described above, have conceded 
that the Constitution’s originally intended meaning “runs out.”94 
The second move made by originalists,95 as a result of originalism’s 
concession of judicial discretion, is their embrace of the concept of 
constitutional construction.96  Constitutional construction is the idea that, in 
at least some cases, the Constitution’s original meaning does not determine 
a case’s outcome.97  The original meaning may limit the range of possible 
outcomes, but judges are left with discretion.98  Although originalists differ 
on which government officials have authority to construct constitutional 
 
 89. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 74, at 752. 
 90. This applies to both the original meaning and original intent versions of originalism. 
See id. at 751. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. at 752. 
 93. See id.  While original intent originalism is open to closure rules in a way that 
original meaning originalism is not, few original intent originalists have argued as 
aggressively as Professors McGinnis and Rappaport that closure rules eliminate all or nearly 
all underdeterminacy.  The notable exception is Richard Kay, who invoked the closure rule 
that “there will be a better answer to every litigated question of constitutional interpretation.” 
Kay, supra note 78, at 721 n.75. 
 94. See Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139, 142–43 (2010) 
(stating that “originalists should concede” that there is “some range of indeterminacy or 
uncertainty”). 
  One may ask why, if the move to original meaning caused an increase in 
originalism’s underdeterminacy, originalists made this move.  The shift was prompted by 
nonoriginalist criticism that the original intent did not exist and/or was not practically 
accessible.  Original meaning originalism either defeats or blunts these criticisms.  However, 
it also opens originalism to the charge that it leaves the original meaning underdetermined.  
In sum, original meaning originalism preserves a determinate core of constitutional meaning 
while conceding an area of underdeterminacy. 
 95. As noted earlier, McGinnis and Rappaport argue that utilization of interpretative 
closure rules eliminates all (or almost all) underdeterminacy. See McGinnis & Rappaport, 
supra note 74, at 752. 
 96. All of the most prominent original meaning originalists have incorporated 
construction into their understandings of originalism. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 118–30; WHITTINGTON, 
supra note 70, at 7–14; Solum, supra note 55, at 24; see also Jack M. Balkin, Framework 
Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 566–75 (2009) (describing 
the important role played by construction in Balkin’s version of originalism). 
 97. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 7. 
 98. See Solum, supra note 55, at 34. 
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meaning when the Constitution’s original meaning is underdeterminate,99 
all originalists agree that construction involves the exercise of relatively100 
unbounded choice.101 
The third manifestation of originalism’s acknowledgment of discretion is 
its retention of some nonoriginalist precedent.  Originalists have argued that 
originalism preserves a place for some nonoriginalist precedent.102  This 
intermediate position—between “get rid of it all” and “keep it all”103—
required originalists to draw a line between those nonoriginalist precedents 
a judge should overrule, and those he should retain.  For example, I argued 
elsewhere that a judge should utilize three factors to determine whether to 
overrule a nonoriginalist precedent.104  Applying these factors will 
 
 99. Compare WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 7, 9, 11 (arguing that construction is a 
political and hence non-judicial enterprise), with BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 122 (“I do not share 
Whittington’s characterization of the process of construction as ‘political.’”). But see Keith 
E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 125–
29 (2010) (modifying his previous position and concluding that, “[s]o long as judges are 
acting as faithful agents to provisionally maintain constitutional understandings widely 
shared by other political actors, then their role in articulating constitutional constructions 
may not be objectionable”). 
 100. That is, relative to the activity of constitutional interpretation. 
 101. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, 
supra note 7, at 122; WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 7. 
  Professor Solum has recently provided a more thorough articulation of his 
conception of constitutional construction. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010).  There, Professor Solum argues 
that constitutional interpretation is the articulation of the Constitution’s linguistic meaning, 
and construction is giving legal effect to constitutional text. See id. at 95–96.  Professor 
Solum’s understanding of construction appears to differ from my description because, in 
Professor Solum’s view, construction occurs even when the Constitution’s original meaning 
determines the outcome of a case. See id. at 107–08 (describing how construction operates 
both when “the legal content of constitutional doctrine is equivalent to the semantic content 
of the text,” and when “the sematic content of the text constrains but does not fully specify 
the legal content of constitutional doctrine”).  Professor Solum’s conception of construction, 
even if different, fits my core point:  most originalists today agree that constitutional 
construction exists and, at least in a significant percentage of cases in the “construction 
zone,” “involve[] judgment or choice.” Id. at 108. 
 102. There is a fairly even split among originalists on whether, and to what extent, 
originalism preserves at least some nonoriginalist precedent.  Originalists scholarship that 
argues in favor of preservation includes Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and 
Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1441–42 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael 
B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 803–04 
(2009); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage:  Constitutional Stare Decisis, 
Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 155–
59 (2006); and Strang, supra note 14, at 419–20. 
 103. I am not aware of any originalists who have advocated keeping all nonoriginalist 
precedent.  There are many scholars who argue for a position similar to this, but they are not 
originalists. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 
511 (1996) (describing the role that precedent would play in a Burkean approach to 
constitutional interpretation). 
 104. The three factors are:  (1) how far does the nonoriginalist precedent deviate from the 
Constitution’s original meaning?; (2) how much, if at all, would overruling the precedent 
harm Rule of Law values?; and (3) does the precedent instantiate fairness? Strang, supra 
note 14, at 472.  I describe my approach to nonoriginalist precedent, and these three factors, 
in greater detail in Part III.C.3.b, infra. 
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frequently be challenging, and judges will frequently have discretion in 
doing so, especially if the factors point in different directions and possess 
different weights.105 
Take, for example, Katzenbach v. McClung,106 which involved the 
question of the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  The 
Supreme Court relied on the substantial effects test, most prominently 
described in the nonoriginalist precedent Wickard v. Filburn,107 to uphold 
Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.108  This, in turn, makes McClung a 
nonoriginalist precedent.109 
If a case arose today in which McClung was challenged, an originalist 
judge would have to utilize three factors (that I articulated in previous 
scholarship).  Very briefly, the judge would likely conclude:  (1) that 
McClung was a significant deviation from the Commerce Clause’s original 
meaning; (2) overruling McClung would have some adverse impact on Rule 
of Law values; and (3) McClung did create fair relationships on the 
important axis of race.  These factors point in different directions and they 
point in their respective directions with varying degrees of weight.  The 
hypothetical judge would have a choice in how to rule. 
Even those originalists who argue for the overruling of all or nearly all 
nonoriginalist precedent retain a place for judicial discretion.  Professor 
Randy Barnett, for instance, who has concluded that “the doctrine of 
precedent is inconsistent with originalism,” acknowledges space for an 
originalist judge to retain nonoriginalist precedent to protect the “claims 
made by particular persons made in reliance on mistaken precedent.”110  
Judges following Professor Barnett’s prescription will exercise discretion to 
determine, among other things, whether the reliance was sufficiently 
directed to the mistaken precedent and whether it was sufficiently weighty. 
In addition to acknowledging judicial discretion in the three contexts I 
identified, originalists also explained that, even in cases where judges do 
not have discretion, they must still utilize judgment, along with other 
human capacities.  This move by originalists took many forms, but two 
characteristics in particular are important for my purposes:  the process of 
articulating and applying the Constitution’s original meaning, and 
originalist precedent. 
First, originalists have begun to explain in more detail the analytical 
process judges utilize.  This process has many features including, 
importantly, the articulation of the Constitution’s original meaning and 
 
 105. Strang, supra note 14, at 484 (“The originalist theory of precedent I have been 
discussing provides that judges will often have broad discretion to determine how to react to 
nonoriginalist constitutional precedent.”). 
 106. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
 107. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 108. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 302–04. 
 109. Assuming that there is not another originalist basis for the decision. 
 110. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning:  Not as Radical as It 
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 259, 266 (2005). 
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application of that meaning.111  Second, and relatedly, originalists have 
argued that originalist precedent plays a central role in originalism.112  Both 
characteristics frequently place tremendous burdens on judges’ judgment 
and their other faculties. 
Today’s transformed originalism has opened a space for judicial 
discretion and a place for the exercise of judicial judgment.  Originalism 
today explicitly acknowledges judicial discretion in the contexts of 
constitutional construction and nonoriginalist precedent.  Further, 
originalism has also embraced the fact that judges exercise judgment, 
constrained though it may be, and other human capacities in the contexts of 
originalist precedent and in the paradigmatic work of articulating and 
applying the Constitution’s original meaning. 
C.  Impasse in Normative Justifications for Originalism 
Originalists have offered a stunning variety of normative justifications 
for originalism.113  However, no one has yet offered a normative foundation 
in virtue ethics.  Instead, two camps of originalists state claims that are 
premised on conflicting philosophical traditions.  One group grounds 
originalism in the deontological tradition,114 and the other utilizes a 
consequentialist foundation.115  While the respective camps have presented 
powerful and nuanced statements for their positions, the ultimate 
incompatibility of the camps’ respective philosophical commitments has 
impeded consensus. 
Professor Barnett, for example, acknowledged that his natural rights-
based justification for originalism may not persuade those who either do not 
believe that natural rights exist or do not believe they play the significant 
role that he attributes to them.116  Barnett, with his characteristic insight, 
then argues that his defense of originalism can incorporate such conflicting 
 
 111. See Solum, supra note 102, at 96; Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent:  
The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1767. 
 112. See Solum, supra note 102, at 185; Strang, supra note 111, at 1766–88. 
 113. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, 
supra note 7, at 54–68, 109–13 (arguing that originalism best protects natural rights); 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 110–59 (grounding originalism in popular sovereignty); 
McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 8, at 802–05 
(arguing that originalism is justified because it protects the good consequences that arise 
from the Constitution’s supermajority requirements); Strang, supra note 22, at 983–97 
(arguing that originalism best secures human flourishing).  Solum has also argued that one 
version of originalism, what he calls “Semantic Originalism,” is compatible with most 
normative justifications for originalism. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 128–
34 (Illinois Pub. L. and Legal Theory Research Papers Series, No. 07-24, Nov. 22, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. 
 114. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, 
supra note 7, at 54–68. 
 115. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 8, at 
802–05. 
 116. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, 
supra note 7, at 3–4. 
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views because it can maximize ultimate values other than natural rights, 
such as good consequences.117 
This situation parallels the one in ethics when Elizabeth Anscombe 
published her path-breaking piece, Modern Moral Philosophy,118 in 
1958.119  There, Anscombe argued that ethics had been locked in an ever-
more-intricate, though still interminable, debate between consequentialists 
and deontologists.120  She suggested that a return to virtue ethics might 
redirect the debate and possibly even overcome the impasse.121   
This Article takes the first step toward making a similar move in the 
context of constitutional interpretation.  By explaining how one of the 
major theories of constitutional interpretation is improved when informed 
by virtue ethics, I set the stage for a later piece that will explicitly ground 
originalism in virtue ethics and the related concept of human flourishing. 
D.  Conclusion 
My goal thus far has been to describe originalism’s rise, the criticism to 
which it has been subject, and originalism’s transformation in response to 
that criticism.  The key point of this transformation is that most conceptions 
of originalism today acknowledge that judicial discretion is an indelible part 
of judging.  Relatedly, as originalists explored originalism’s contours, the 
transformed originalism has acknowledged the sometimes great burdens on 
judges’ judgment and other capacities. 
At this point, however, no originalists have explained how these 
modifications—judicial discretion and burdens on judges’ capacities—do 
not undermine originalism’s core insights.  Why does significant discretion 
not undermine originalism’s source thesis?122  And, why do the burdens 
placed on judges’ judgment and capacities not undercut originalism’s 
contribution thesis?123  In Part III, I show that virtue ethics provides 
answers to these questions.  Virtue ethics has the conceptual “tool kit” to 
explain how the transformed originalism maintains its core commitments. 
 
 117. See id. 
 118. Anscombe, supra note 19. 
 119. A similar claim is made and expanded upon in Farrelly & Solum, supra note 3, at 3–
6. 
 120. See Anscombe, supra note 19, at 9, 13–14. 
 121. See id. at 18. 
 122. For the most thorough discussion of the source and contributions theses in print, see 
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
923, 953–54 (2009). See also Solum, supra note 55, at 29–32 (describing the theses); Randy 
E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011) 
(providing a slightly different statement of originalism’s core propositions). 
 123. See supra note 122 (discussing the contribution thesis). 
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II.  THE ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION AND THE RETURN 
TO VIRTUE ETHICS 
A.  The Aristotelian Philosophical Tradition:  Background 
The Aristotelian philosophical tradition is the central Western 
philosophical tradition.124  It has its origin in Greek thought, particularly 
Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates.125  In the High Middle Ages,126 after the fall 
of the Western Roman Empire,127 St. Thomas Aquinas began the synthesis 
of Aristotle’s thought with the Christian philosophical inheritance, 
especially from St. Augustine.128  The Aristotelian tradition flourished until 
the onset of the Reformation when, due to many factors,129 other 
philosophical traditions eclipsed it in many areas of Europe and the West 
more generally.130 
The alacrity and comprehensiveness of this move away from the 
Aristotelian tradition varied.  For instance, in Catholic Spain, the tradition 
experienced a Silver Age in the sixteenth century, when a number of 
scholars turned with renewed interest to apply Aristotelian philosophical 
concepts to new circumstances, such as the discovery of American 
Indians131 and the rise of capitalism.132  By the late nineteenth century—
outside of subcultures such as Catholic institutions—the Aristotelian 
tradition was swept from the field in the West.133 
 
 124. See GEORGE, supra note 2, at 5 (describing the Aristotelian tradition in this manner). 
 125. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?  WHICH RATIONALITY? 89–90 (1988) 
(“It is Plato’s project which Aristotle vindicates and . . . completes . . . .”). 
 126. See CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE 140–217 
(1991) (describing various facets of the High Middle Ages). 
 127. The key bridge figure between ancient philosophy and Scholasticism was Boethius.  
For a brief biography of Boethius, see W. Turner, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, in 
THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1907), available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/
02610b.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
 128. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY:  
ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 120, 123–24 (1990) (describing St. Thomas’s 
synthesis). 
 129. These factors included the Reformers perception that their religious doctrines were 
at odds with Aristotle’s philosophical claims. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 165 
(2d ed. 1984).  The Reformers also perceived in Aristotle a too-close ally of the Catholic 
Church. See id.  Another factor was the rise of modern science, which explained natural 
phenomena without resort to the heretofore central Aristotelian concepts of essential form 
and final cause. See JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT 
DOCTRINE 112–13 (1991).  A corresponding philosophical move to eliminate the concepts of 
essential form and final end was made by many philosophers in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Id. at 113–21. 
 130. See MACINTYRE, supra note 125, at 209–13. 
 131. See, e.g., FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, O.P., DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES 
(1532) (J.P. Bate trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1917) (utilizing the Aristotelian tradition’s 
concepts to argue for protections of American Indians); see also GORDLEY, supra note 129, 
at 69–71 (describing the broader Thomistic revival). 
 132. See MACINTYRE, supra note 125, at 211. 
 133. See GORDLEY, supra note 129, at 161 (“[T]he authority of Aristotle collapsed in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”). 
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A worldwide natural law revival occurred in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.134  Focus on Aristotle’s and especially St. Thomas 
Aquinas’s thought characterized what is commonly labeled the Neo-
Scholastic or Neo-Thomistic revival.135  This revival was, to a large but not 
complete degree,136 limited to the Catholic intellectual world.  However, it 
fragmented in the late 1950s and early 1960s.137 
In the past thirty years, a more broad-based natural law revival has 
occurred.  The commonly cited138 initiation of today’s revival is the 
publication of John Finnis’s Natural Law and Natural Rights in 1980.139  
Contemporaneous with this natural law revival has been the modern revival 
of interest in virtue ethics, which I discuss below.140 
B.  Relationship Between the Broader Aristotelian Tradition 
and Virtue Ethics 
The Aristotelian tradition has many facets.  It makes robust theoretical 
and practical claims.141  In this Article, I focus on one concept at home in 
the tradition:  virtue.142 
Philosophy is traditionally divided into theoretical (also known as 
speculative)143 and practical subdisciplines.144  Theoretical philosophy’s 
goal is truth about reality,145 such as in metaphysics, which deals with the 
 
 134. See MACINTYRE, supra note 128, at 72–77; GERALD A. MCCOOL, S.J., THE NEO-
THOMISTS 25–40 (1994). 
 135. See MCCOOL, supra note 134, at 1–42; GERALD A. MCCOOL, S.J., FROM UNITY TO 
PLURALISM:  THE INTERNAL EVOLUTION OF THOMISM 29–32 (1989). 
 136. For instance, Mortimer Adler, a prominent mid-twentieth century philosopher, was a 
well-known Thomist. See William Grimes, Mortimer Adler, 98, Dies; Helped Create Study 
of Classics, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at B8 (describing Adler as “championing” the ideas 
of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas).  Another example of the penetration of the Neo-
Scholastic revival was Jacques Maritain’s involvement in drafting the U.N. Declaration on 
Human Rights. See generally JULIE KERNAN, OUR FRIEND, JACQUES MARITAIN (1975). 
 137. See MCCOOL, supra note 135, at 34–35, 224–30. 
 138. See Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in 
NATURAL LAW THEORY:  CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). 
 139. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). 
 140. The revival of interest in virtue ethics is frequently tied to Elizabeth Anscombe’s 
1958 piece, Modern Moral Philosophy. See supra note 19.  In Catholic circles, the Second 
Vatican Council’s call for a renewal of moral theology is frequently cited as the cause for 
renewed interest in virtue ethics. See, e.g., ROMANUS CESSARIO, O.P., INTRODUCTION TO 
MORAL THEOLOGY 129–30, 241–42 (2001) (making this claim). 
 141. See, e.g., ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–I, Q. 46, art. 1 (arguing, against Aristotle, 
that the universe was created by an eternal God); id. at I–II, Q. 94, art. 2 (describing the first 
principle of natural law and three primary principles of natural law:  self-preservation, 
procreation, and practical reasonableness). 
 142. For St. Thomas’s most wide-ranging discussion of virtue, see his Treatise on Habits, 
id. at I–II, QQ. 49–89. 
 143. See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 38 (1998) (explaining the challenges of translating 
St. Thomas’s “speculativa”). 
 144. See id. at 21 (describing the four orders of science, which include two practical 
orders and two non-practical orders). 
 145. See RALPH MCINERNY, ETHICA THOMISTICA:  THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS 
AQUINAS 24–25 (1997) (giving this description). 
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subject of being.146  Practical philosophy’s goal is guiding human action, 
such as in ethics, the subject matter of which includes the licitness of 
human actions.147  Virtue ethics falls into the category of practical 
philosophy.148 
In the Aristotelian philosophical tradition as, for example, in the 
deontological tradition, there are significant relationships between 
theoretical and practical propositions.  One instance of this is the 
relationship between the metaphysical understanding of human beings as 
having a form (essence, or soul), and the practical proposition that human 
acts are good when they conform to the type of being humans are149:  
rational animals.150  This Article, by focusing on the practical philosophical 
concept of virtue, puts to one side most concepts from theoretical 
philosophy, and much of practical philosophy as well. 
C.  Virtue Ethics, Natural Law, and the Return to Virtue Ethics 
Virtue ethics is one of the three prominent ethical traditions in the 
West.151  Its most widespread form is Aristotelian.152  The two other 
competing ethical traditions are deontology and consequentialism.153  I first 
describe virtue ethics and its relationship to the broader Aristotelian 
philosophical tradition, emphasizing what makes virtue ethics distinct from 
other ethical traditions. 
1.  Virtue Ethics 
Virtue ethics is primarily characterized by its focus on the concept of 
virtue in the ethical life.154  In answer to what is usually taken as the 
fundamental ethical question of “what sorts of action should I do?,”155 a 
virtue theorist answers, “what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically . . . do in the circumstances.”156  However, virtue ethics 
 
 146. For an accessible modern statement, see W. NORRIS CLARK, S.J., THE ONE AND THE 
MANY:  A CONTEMPORARY THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS (2001). 
 147. See MCINERNY, supra note 145, at 23–25. 
 148. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 55, art.1. 
 149. See id. at I–II, Q. 50, art. 2 (tying the virtues to the soul). 
 150. See id. at I–I, Q. 76, art. 1 (stating that man has a rational soul that is united with his 
body). 
 151. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 1–3. 
 152. See id. at 8 (articulating a “neo-Aristotelian” virtue ethics); MCINERNY, supra note 
145, at 12–25 (describing Aristotle’s ethics and how it formed the basis for Thomistic 
ethics); ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 55, art. 1 (relying on “[t]he Philosopher” to 
define virtue). 
  I describe below that virtue theorists tend to fall into two distinct but related camps.  
One group is composed of Neo-Aristotelians who focus on Aristotle to the not-complete 
exclusion of later, religious interpreters of Aristotle, such as St. Thomas Aquinas.  The other 
group of scholars attempts to utilize Aristotle and his (primarily) Christian followers, 
especially St. Thomas Aquinas, and later philosophers, including the Spanish Scholastics. 
See infra Part II.C.3. 
 153. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 1–3. 
 154. See id. at 1. 
 155. Id. at 26. 
 156. Id. at 28. 
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pushes back against the question itself.  In virtue ethics, the fundamental 
issue is not action: it is character.157  Virtue theorists argue that the focus of 
ethical inquiry should be the instantiation and exercise of virtue, not an 
algorithm of right action.158 
Virtue is a habit159—an entrenched disposition of character160—to 
perform a human function well.  For example, the virtue of fortitude 
enables one to ascertain what courage requires in concrete situations and 
to—willingly—act accordingly.161  A person who possesses fortitude will 
know what courage requires in particular situations, have the intellectual 
disposition to act courageously when called to do so, be emotionally 
disposed to act courageously, and will reliably act courageously.162  “The 
concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor 
good; a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent, or admirable person 
who acts and reacts well, rightly, as she should—she gets things right.”163 
Virtues are conventionally divided into two categories164:  intellectual 
virtues and moral virtues.165  The intellectual virtues perfect our reasoning 
faculties.  Those intellectual virtues located in the speculative intellect are 
understanding, science, and theoretical wisdom;166 the intellectual virtues in 
the practical intellect are practical wisdom or prudence, and art.167  The 
moral virtues perfect our appetites and most prominently include justice, 
temperance, and fortitude.168 
Later, in Part III, I use examples to detail how these various virtues 
operate in originalist constitutional interpretation.  At this point, however, 
let me briefly describe the foundational set of virtues that operate in the 
context of judging.  Judging, as a general activity—in other words, not 
confined to constitutional interpretation—requires a number of virtues for 
its successful execution.169  Professor Lawrence Solum identified and 
 
 157. See id. at 29. 
 158. See id. at 2–3. 
 159. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 56, art. 3 (“[V]irtue is a habit by which we 
work well.”). 
 160. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 10–12. 
 161. See JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES:  PRUDENCE, JUSTICE, FORTITUDE, 
TEMPERANCE 115–41 (1965) (describing the virtue of fortitude).  Being virtuous, including 
being courageous, requires the assistance of practical wisdom. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 
1, at 12. 
 162. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 10–12 (making a similar claim regarding 
honesty). 
 163. Id. at 13. 
 164. This distinction was traditionally based on the portion of the soul in which the virtue 
operated.  Intellectual virtues are facets of the soul’s rational part, see ST. THOMAS, supra 
note 1, at I–II, Q. 56, art. 3, while moral virtues are facets of the sensitive portion of the 
irrational soul, see id. at I–II, Q. 56, art. 4. 
 165. See id. at I–II, Q. 56, arts. 3–4. 
 166. See id. at I–II, Q. 57, art. 2. 
 167. See MCINERNY, supra note 145, at 96 (giving this description). 
 168. See id. at 97–98. 
 169. The virtues correspond to vices.  For instance, the virtue of theoretical wisdom 
corresponds to the vice of stupidity. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 36 (describing how 
virtue theorists may articulate rules of conduct from virtues and their corresponding vices). 
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described the primary virtues required for judging,170 and my discussion 
parallels his excellent scholarship. 
The principal judicial virtues include:  theoretical wisdom, practical 
wisdom, justice-as-lawfulness, temperance,171 and fortitude.  Next, I 
describe each of these virtues in more detail. 
A judge is excellent only if he has the theoretical wisdom—the 
intellectual “firepower,” we might say—to perform the relatively abstract 
legal tasks necessary to judging.  Judges must possess this capacity in order 
to know and understand the law that bears on a given case.  In some cases, 
especially hard cases,172 this task places tremendous burdens on the judge’s 
faculties and, depending on one’s theory of adjudication, judges may have 
to utilize theoretical wisdom on a regular basis.173 
Theoretical wisdom first enables the judge to master the law’s “data”:  
the cases, statutes, regulations, legal principles, and legal practices that are 
pertinent to the case before the judge.174  This mastery has two components:  
the judge’s pre-existing knowledge of the law in the judge’s jurisdiction, 
and the knowledge of the law that the judge gathers in the context of a 
particular case.175  Building on this knowledge of the legal data, the judge 
must then uncover the relationship between the pertinent legal materials—
which of the legal data structures the other pieces, and how the data is 
structured.176  Theoretical wisdom permits the judge to arrive at the 
structure of legal norms governing a case.177 
For instance, to understand how the Fifth Amendment’s Public Use 
Clause governs a particular case, a judge would have to grasp the Clause’s 
original meaning, read and understand originalist precedent applying the 
Clause, and ascertain any authoritative practices under the Clause.178  Then, 
the judge would synthesize this data into a coherent legal structure.  Most 
frequently, this takes the form of the legal rules, standards, or principles 
 
 170. Professor Solum has written on this subject in many fora. See supra note 9 (listing 
several works by Professor Solum); see also FARRELLY & SOLUM, supra note 3, at 1–23, 
142–92.  For a balanced critique of Professor Solum’s virtue jurisprudence thesis, see R.A. 
Duff, The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 214 (2003). 
 171. Professor Solum identified the additional virtue of judicial temperament. See Solum, 
Virtue Jurisprudence:  A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note 9, at 191. 
 172. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81–130 (1977). 
 173. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:  A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note 
9, at 182–83 (making this point regarding Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity). 
 174. See STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 51–54 (1992) (describing the 
reasons that judges incorporate into their analysis). 
 175. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:  A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note 
9, at 191–92 (describing how a judge’s pre-existing mastery of law is pertinent to, but not a 
manifestation of, theoretical wisdom). 
 176. See BURTON, supra note 174, at 54–59; Strang, supra note 77, at 66–67. 
 177. As Professor Solum has pointed out, theoretical wisdom is also important because it 
gives judges “the ability to grasp the facts of disputes that may involve particular 
disciplines.” Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence, supra note 9, at 191. 
 178. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505–14 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (synthesizing the Public Use Clause’s original meaning from the Clause’s text, 
the text and structure of the rest of the Constitution, and early American state practice); see 
also County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 779–83 (Mich. 2004) (surveying the 
Michigan Constitution’s text and original understanding of that text). 
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tailored to the factual context presented by the case.179  At each step, 
without significant intellectual capabilities, the judge will perform poorly.  
Consequently, judges need theoretical wisdom to perform these tasks well. 
Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that enables its possessor to 
perform two tasks well:  first, identify those goods that are valuable and 
therefore worth pursuing; and second, perceive the means most conducive 
to pursuing those identified goods.180  Practical wisdom, in the context of 
judging, is primarily concerned with the second task.181  Practical wisdom 
provides the capacity to articulate legal doctrine that mediates legal 
meaning and the facts presented in cases.182 
Using the Commerce Clause as an example, once a judge has mastered 
the Clause’s operative legal meaning, the judge must still apply that 
meaning in a case.  In doing so, the judge will articulate legal doctrines that 
connect the meaning to the facts.  In the Commerce Clause context, the pre-
New Deal Supreme Court created a series of doctrines, such as the original 
packages doctrine183 and the instrumentalities of commerce doctrine,184 
among others,185 to do just that.  These legal doctrines bridged the 
 
 179. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 514 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Public Use Clause is most 
naturally read to authorize takings for public use only if the government or the public 
actually uses the taken property.”); see also Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (“[T]he transfer of 
condemned property to a private entity, seen through the eyes of an individual sophisticated 
in the law at the time of ratification of our 1963 Constitution, would be appropriate in one of 
three contexts:  (1) where public necessity of the extreme sort requires collective action; (2) 
where the property remains subject to public oversight after transfer to a private entity; and 
(3) where the property is selected because of facts of independent public significance, rather 
than the interests of the private entity to which the property is eventually transferred.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 180. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 57, art. 5; Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:  A 
Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note 9, at 192. 
 181. Practical wisdom in the context of judging is primarily concerned with the second 
task because the judge’s ends are, in the focal case of judging, set for the judge by the 
pertinent law.  As I describe below, however, practical wisdom, in situations when judges 
exercise discretion, also plays the first role of identifying goods worth pursuing.  This 
occurs, for instance, in the contexts of nonoriginalist precedent and constitutional 
construction discussed in Part III.C.3, infra. 
 182. See Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 767–71 
(1989) (describing how legal doctrine impacts citizens’ practical deliberations); see also 
Strang, supra note 14, at 486 (describing the relatively free-ranging role practical wisdom 
will play in the context of nonoriginalist precedent). 
 183. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441–42 (1827) (“It is sufficient 
for the present to say, generally, that when the importer has so acted upon the thing 
imported, that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the 
country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to 
the taxing power of the State; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his 
warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too 
plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution.”). 
 184. See Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (articulating the 
instrumentalities of commerce doctrine). 
 185. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905) (“[W]hen this is a 
typical, constantly recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce 
among the states, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce.”); 
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 517 (1922) (reaffirming and applying the holding of 
Swift). 
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analytical space between the Clause’s original meaning and the recurring 
factual situations presented by the cases in which the Court articulated those 
doctrines.186 
Justice-as-lawfulness is the virtue of giving one’s society’s laws their 
due.187  Justice-as-lawfulness is, in many ways, the excellence that defines a 
good judge qua judge.188  Saint Thomas Aquinas recognized this when he 
described the etymology of “judge.”189  Without the virtue of justice, a 
judge’s incredible intellect, stout courage, and measured temperament 
would only make the judge worse.190 
A just judge is one who exercises judgment191 “according to the written 
law.”192  The judge who possesses the virtue of justice-as-lawfulness has 
the “habit . . .  [of] render[ing] to each one his due by a constant and 
perpetual will.”193  Saint Thomas’s linking of justice-as-lawfulness to a 
society’s positive law flows from the essential role positive law plays in 
securing a society’s common good.194  In this, St. Thomas followed 
Aristotle.195 
The virtue of justice-as-lawfulness has the most “bite” when a judge 
faces a law that the judge does not think—at least in that instance—
advances the common good.196  For example, in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court denied Joshua 
DeShaney’s claim of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause for the county’s failure to protect him from his wicked 
father’s abuse.197  The Court acknowledged that it was moved with “natural 
sympathy . . . to find a way for Joshua and his mother to receive adequate 
compensation for the grievous harm inflicted upon them.”198  The Court’s 
 
 186. See Strang, supra note 111, at 1767–78 (describing this phenomenon in the context 
of originalist precedent). 
 187. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1095a (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed. 1999); 
RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE:  POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 102–03, 106 (2002). 
 188. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:  A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note 
9, at 194 (stating that justice is central to our concept of a good judge). 
 189. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at II–II, Q. 60, art. 1. 
 190. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:  A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note 
9, at 194 (describing such a judge as “an especially bad judge”). 
 191. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at II–II, Q. 60, art. 1. 
 192. Id. at II–II, Q. 60, art. 5.  For St. Thomas, since the written law is fully law only 
insofar as it instantiates the natural law, see id. at II–II, Q. 60, art. 5, a judge’s duty to follow 
positive law is contingent on its relationship, or lack thereof, to the natural law (with some 
qualifications). Cf. Horwitz, supra note 67, at 154–55 (arguing that a virtuous judge is not 
necessarily a formalist judge). 
 193. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at II–II, Q. 58, art. 1. 
 194. See id. at I–II, Q. 96, art. 4. 
 195. See KRAUT, supra note 187, at 102–11 (describing justice-as-lawfulness as the virtue 
of giving the community’s laws their due regard because they provide the framework within 
which the common good is possible). 
 196. For example, if the law is not the product of practical wisdom and is instead “special 
interest legislation,” it violates distributive justice. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 
96, art. 4. 
 197. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 198. Id. at 202–03. 
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faithfulness to the Constitution—its refusal to improperly expand the Due 
Process Clause’s scope199—exemplified justice-as-lawfulness.200 
Temperance and fortitude describe two facets of judicial character that a 
judge must possess to rule according to the law.201  A temperate judge will 
hold in check his sensual appetites.202  A temperate judge will be resistant 
to the allure of, for instance, the “good life” that a bribe could buy.203  
Courage is the firmness of mind that enables one to react appropriately to 
danger,204 and a courageous judge will rule according to the law even in the 
face of potential harm to his reputation, career, or even family and life.205 
2.  Virtue, Human Flourishing, and the Natural Law 
Important to fully understanding the concept of virtue in the Aristotelian 
tradition is a related concept:  human flourishing.206  Virtue ethics is 
teleological because the goal towards which the virtues enable their 
possessor to move is human flourishing.207  Virtue is both constitutive of 
human flourishing and instrumental to securing it. 
Human flourishing is the state of being most fully human which, in the 
Aristotelian tradition, means acting rationally excellently.208  Humans are 
distinct from other animals by having the capacity to reason.209  As a result, 
a human will be most fully human when he exercises his reason—both 
theoretical and practical—excellently.210  A person’s excellent utilization of 
 
 199. There is an at least plausible argument that a claim such as DeShaney’s should be 
viable under the Equal Protection Clause. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM:  RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 9–44 (1994) 
(arguing that the abolitionists understood the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
require government protection from private violence). 
 200. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203. 
 201. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:  A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note 
9, at 189–91 (describing these virtues). 
 202. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at II–II, Q. 141, art. 1–2. 
 203. See United States v. Nixon, 816 F.2d 1022, 1023 (5th Cir. 1987) (describing how 
Judge Nixon, who was later impeached for perjury arising out of the investigation of bribery 
charges, had “been dissatisfied with his modest judicial salary, and had looked for means of 
augmenting it”). 
 204. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at II–II, Q. 123, art. 1–2. 
 205. See generally J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN:  SOUTHERN FEDERAL 
JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1971) (describing the challenges faced by federal 
judges enforcing desegregation in the South). 
 206. Aristotle used the term eudaimonia to describe the end goal of human action.  This 
term was traditionally translated as “happiness.” See ARISTOTLE, supra note 187, at 1095a.  
Saint Thomas used the term beatitudo, which likewise was translated as “happiness.”  See 
ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 1, art. 7 (“[A]ll men agree in desiring the last end, 
which is happiness.”). 
 207. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 29 (stating that the virtues enable their possessor 
to achieve “eudaimonia, to flourish or live well”). 
 208. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 187, at 1098a; see also ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, 
Q. 3, art. 5 (following Aristotle’s position). 
 209. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 1, art. 1; see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, 
DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS:  WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES 11–51 (1999) 
(reviewing the extent to which nonhuman animals possess characteristically human 
capacities such as reason). 
 210. ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 3, art. 5. 
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his intellectual faculties is acting virtuously.211  Therefore, human 
flourishing is partially constituted by virtue. 
Virtue also equips humans to achieve human flourishing.212  The virtues 
are those habits of character that perfect the portion of their possessor to 
which they obtain.213  For example, a human does not flourish if he is not 
temperate.  A person who characteristically eats excessively has the vice of 
intemperance.214  That person has difficulty controlling his pursuit of 
physical goods, like food and drink.215  The desire for food controls the 
person so that the person acts, not in accord with his practical reason, but 
instead by dictate of his passion.  This person, because of his lack of virtue, 
is prevented from flourishing.  To flourish, the intemperate person must 
acquire the means to do so—a temperate disposition. 
Virtue ethics is distinct from, but related to, natural law.  Saint Thomas 
Aquinas described the relationship between virtue and natural law as two 
complementary mechanisms that direct humans toward human 
flourishing.216  Virtues are internal guides to flourishing, while natural law 
provides external guidance.217 
Natural law is the body of norms that identifies which actions are, and 
which are not, conducive to human flourishing.218  Natural law norms are 
natural because they are tied to human nature:  they identify which actions 
are right and wrong by reference to a being with human characteristics.219  
Natural law precepts are tied to human nature via the goods that natural law 
norms direct humans to instantiate.220  Primary among the characteristics of 
 
 211. Id. at I–II, Q. 3, art. 2. 
 212. See id. at I–II, Q. 49, introduction (describing virtue as an “intrinsic principle” of 
human action); Id. at I–II, Q. 55, art. 1 (describing virtue as the “perfection of a power,” 
which in humans is rational). 
 213. See id. at I–II, Q. 55, art. 1 (describing virtue as the “perfection of a power”). 
 214. See id. at II–II, Q. 148, art. 1 (describing gluttony as the “inordinate desire” for 
“eating and drinking”). 
 215. Id. 
 216. See CESSARIO, supra note 140, at 94–95 (describing the relationship between virtue 
and natural law).  For an extended discussion of the relationship between natural law and 
virtue in St. Thomas’s thought, see Thomas Stewart Hibbs, The Pedagogy of Law and Virtue 
in the Summa Theologiae (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Notre Dame University) 
(on file with the Fordham Law Review); Michel Therrien, Law, Liberty & Virtue:  A 
Thomistic Defense for the Pedagogical Character of Law (2007) (unpublished Th.D. 
dissertation, University of Fribourg) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
 217. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 49, introduction (describing virtue as the 
“intrinsic principle” of human action while natural law is the “extrinsic principle[]”). 
 218. See id. at I–II, Q. 90, art. 2 (“[T]he law must needs regard principally the 
relationship to happiness.”). 
 219. See id. at I–II, Q. 91, art. 2 (describing natural law as “the rational creature’s 
participation of the eternal law”); id. at I–II, Q. 94, art. 4 (“[T]he natural law belongs [to] 
those things to which a man is inclined naturally:  and among these it is proper to man to be 
inclined to act according to reason.”); see also FINNIS, supra note 139, at 34 (“The basic 
forms of good grasped by practical understanding are what is good for human beings with 
the nature they have.”). 
 220. The New Natural Law scholars, including, most prominently, Germain Grisez and 
John Finnis, have focused their arguments on describing the basic human goods that form 
the foundation for their conception of natural law. See 1 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE 
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humans is both a rational and animal nature.221  For instance, the first 
principles of practical reason identified by St. Thomas include the 
directions to act practically reasonably, and to preserve oneself.222 
The virtues work hand-in-hand with natural law directives to facilitate 
pursuit of human flourishing.  Most important, the virtue of practical 
wisdom imparts the capacity to correctly identify the principles of natural 
law via identification of the goods towards which natural law directs human 
actions.223  Practical wisdom also facilitates the choice of the best means to 
secure a basic human good.224 
The moral virtues ensure that one’s appetites for goods are properly 
ordered by one’s reason.225  This ensures that one’s vision of what the 
natural law requires is not blurred, and that one’s passions do not overawe 
one’s (correct) judgment about what the natural law requires one to do.226  
In sum, both virtue and natural law are tools that facilitate one’s pursuit of 
happiness. 
This Article explains how originalism and the judicial virtues have an 
analogous relationship to natural law and virtue.  The Constitution’s 
original meaning plays a role parallel to natural law because it contains the 
external positive227 norms that direct judges toward our society’s common 
good.  The judicial virtues, like virtue more generally, are the internal habits 
of character that enable judges to know and faithfully apply the original 
meaning.  Both the original meaning and judicial virtues aim to secure the 
common good of society; both natural law and virtue aim toward human 
flourishing. 
3.  Return to Virtue Ethics 
The modern growth of interest in virtue ethics paralleled (and partially 
coincided with) that of natural law which, as I mentioned above, 
experienced a revival beginning with John Finnis’s celebrated Natural Law 
 
LORD JESUS:  CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES, ch. 5, Q. D, art. 11 (describing seven categories 
of basic human goods); see also FINNIS, supra note 139, at 59–126 (same). 
 221. Hence, virtues are divided into intellectual virtues and moral virtues. 
 222. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 94, art. 2. 
 223. See id. at I–II, Q. 94, art. 1 (“Synderesis [practical wisdom] . . . is a habit containing 
the precepts of the natural law . . . .”); see also FINNIS, supra note 139, at 34 (“[B]y a simple 
act of non-inferential understanding one grasps that the object of the inclination which one 
experiences is an instance of a general form of good . . . .”). 
 224. See FINNIS, supra note 139, at 88 (describing this facet of practical reason). 
 225. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I–II, Q. 94, art. 4 (describing how one’s ability to 
know and abide by the natural law may be challenged “both as to rectitude and as to 
knowledge”); see also FINNIS, supra note 139, at 88 (describing how practical reason can 
help “to bring one’s emotions and dispositions into the harmony of an inner peace of mind”). 
 226. The most famous instance of a person’s disordered appetite preventing that person 
from pursuing a known principle of natural law was St. Augustine’s theft of pears. See ST. 
AUGUSTINE, THE CONFESSIONS, bk. II, chs. 4–8 (R.S. Pine-Coffin trans., 1961).  In this, St. 
Augustine recounts how, as a youth, he stole pears from a neighbor’s tree despite the fact 
that he was not hungry and that his parents’ pear tree produced better fruit. Id.  St. Augustine 
used this episode to exemplify the power of a disordered will—one not tamed by the moral 
virtues—and how it could push one to perform an act that one knows is wicked. See id. 
 227. Here, I utilize the understanding of natural law as posited by God. 
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and Natural Rights.228  Starting with a seminal article by Elizabeth 
Anscombe in 1958, Modern Moral Philosophy,229 virtue ethics experienced 
its modern revival.230  Since 1958—first as a trickle, and now as a strong 
current—virtue ethics has established a significant scholarly presence.231  
Virtue ethics has grown dramatically in the last forty years to become a 
respected participant in moral philosophy.232 
Today, though the most prominent proponents of virtue ethics have their 
home in the Aristotelian tradition, they are divided in their relationship (or 
lack thereof) to what is variously called the Thomistic or Natural Law 
tradition.233  Some prominent scholars in the virtue ethics field are 
relatively distinct from the Thomistic tradition.234  This group of Neo-
Aristotelians most prominently includes Philippa Foot235 and Rosalind 
Hursthouse.236  The other distinct set of scholars works within the 
Thomistic tradition.237 
These various schools of virtue ethics have much in common.  In 
particular, and for purposes of this Article, they overlap significantly in 
their understanding of what counts as a virtue and the primary virtues.238 
 
 228. FINNIS, supra note 139. 
 229. Anscombe, supra note 19, at 1; see also FARRELLY & SOLUM, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 230. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 1–4. 
 231. For a selection of recent and more prominent works, see JULIA ANNAS, THE 
MORALITY OF HAPPINESS (1993); CESARRIO, supra note 140; FARRELLY & SOLUM, supra 
note 3; PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS (2001); PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND 
OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1978); HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE? (Roger Crisp ed., 
1996); HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1; MACINTYRE, supra note 129; SERVAIS PINCKAERS, O.P., 
THE SOURCES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS (Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P., trans., 1995); MICHAEL 
SLOTE, FROM MORALITY TO VIRTUE (1992); and CHRISTINE SWANTON, VIRTUE ETHICS:  A 
PLURALISTIC VIEW (2003). 
 232. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that virtue ethics “has acquired full 
status, recognized as a rival to deontological and utilitarian approaches”). 
 233. For a history of Thomism, see ROMANUS CESSARIO, O.P., A SHORT HISTORY OF 
THOMISM (2005).  For a history of early to mid-twentieth century Neo-Thomism, see 
MCCOOL, supra note 134, and MCCOOL, supra note 135. 
 234. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 3 (“The modern philosophers whom we think of 
as having put virtue ethics on the map . . . had all absorbed Plato and Aristotle, and in some 
cases also Aquinas.”) (emphasis added). 
 235. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 3; see also FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS, supra note 
231, at 53, 72 (repeatedly citing Aristotle, but referencing St. Thomas three times).  Though 
Foot passed away in late 2010, her work continues to have significant influence. 
 236. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 8 (“The particular version of virtue ethics I detail 
and discuss . . . is of a more general kind known as ‘neo-Aristotelian.’”). 
 237. See, e.g., CESSARIO, supra note 140, at xvii (stating that his work is deeply indebted 
to St. Thomas’s work); WILLIAM E. MAY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL THEOLOGY (2d ed. 
2003) (relying heavily on St. Thomas). 
 238. The most important distinction between them is that the Neo-Aristotelian virtue 
theorists focus on virtue ethics derived from human nature understood in contemporary 
biological terms, while the Thomists frequently present arguments grounded in a 
metaphysical teleology.  Alasdair MacIntyre straddles both schools, especially in his 
Dependent Rational Animals, where MacIntyre changes the course of his scholarship and 
embraces the proposition that virtues are based on the “form of life . . . possible for beings 
who are biologically constituted as we are.” MACINTYRE, supra note 209, at x; see also id. at 
xi (describing his deep debt to St. Thomas’s thought). 
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D.  Virtue Ethics’ Limited Impact on Legal Scholarship 
Despite flourishing in philosophical discourse, virtue ethics has only 
barely begun to penetrate legal scholarship.  Professor Lawrence Solum has 
most prominently brought virtue ethics’ lessons to bear on legal issues.  
Solum has written a series of articles, and co-edited a book, focusing on the 
intersection of law and virtue ethics.239  A handful of scholars in specific 
fields of law have similarly begun applying virtue ethics’ insights to 
particular areas of law.240 
There is, as of yet, no work describing the role that virtue may and 
should play in originalism.  This Article partially fills that gap by 
explaining the multifarious ways in which virtue is essential to a fully 
developed theory of  originalism. 
III.  ORIGINALISM IS BETTER BECAUSE IT HAS A HOME FOR VIRTUE 
In this Part, I locate the important points in the process of originalist 
constitutional interpretation where virtue can and should play a role.  What 
I describe is a human practice that requires participants with particular 
qualities if the practice is to flourish. 
I begin by noting the common perception that originalism and virtue 
ethics are incompatible.  In response, I argue that originalism can 
incorporate virtue ethics’ insights.  Then, and most importantly, I show that 
originalism should incorporate virtue ethics’ insights because doing so will 
make originalism more descriptively accurate and normatively attractive. 
A.  Originalism Is Not Immune to Virtue 
Originalism can learn from virtue ethics.  There is nothing inherent in 
originalism—its core claims, its foundational premises, or its practical 
implementation—that precludes it from incorporating virtue ethics’ 
insights.  For example, originalism’s core claims are described by the 
fixation and contribution theses.241  The fixation thesis is that the 
 
 239. See supra note 9 (listing Professor Solum’s works on virtue ethics and law).  Most 
important for purposes of this Article, Solum published an article titled Virtue 
Jurisprudence:  A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, where he articulated a virtue-focused 
theory of judging. See supra note 9. 
 240. See, e.g., Chapin F. Cimino, Virtue and Contract Law, 88 OR. L. REV. 703 (2009) 
(contract law); R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability:  Do We Want an Aristotelian 
Criminal Law?, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 147 (2002) (criminal law); Heidi Li Feldman, 
Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence:  Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1431 (2000) (tort law); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues:  Can Good Lawyers Be Good 
Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (1996) (legal ethics); Kyron Huigens, Virtue 
and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423 (1995) (criminal law); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land 
Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009) (property law); H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional 
Virtues, 9 GREEN BAG 379 (2006) (constitutional law); Ekow N. Yankah, Virtue’s Domain, 
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167 (criminal law); see also Horwitz, supra note 67, at 144–66 
(applying virtue ethics to judging generally). 
 241. For the most thorough discussion of these theses in print, see Solum, supra note 122, 
at 944, 954. See also Solum, supra note 55, at 29–32 (describing the theses); Randy E. 
Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011) 
(providing a slightly different statement of originalism’s core propositions). 
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Constitution’s meaning was fixed when it was ratified.242  This is the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  The contribution thesis is that the 
Constitution’s original meaning contributes to the content of constitutional 
law.243 
Virtue ethics’ claims have little, if anything, to say regarding these theses 
because they address different subjects.  Virtue ethics addresses human 
character and acts, while the fixation and contribution theses address the 
criteria for the truth of claims regarding constitutional meaning (within 
originalism).  For example, fortitude, in the context of judging, bears on 
whether or not a judge has the courage to articulate the Constitution’s 
original meaning, not whether or to what extent the Constitution’s meaning 
was fixed at the point of ratification.244 
Similarly, originalism’s foundational premises are consistent with virtue 
ethics.  For instance, originalism is premised on the proposition that the 
Constitution’s original meaning is recoverable.245  Virtue ethics has nothing 
to say directly to this originalist premise.  Instead, virtue ethics can accept 
the premise and help describe how an interpreter can fulfill that premise. 
Lastly, originalism’s practical implementation via constitutional 
precedent,246 among other mechanisms,247 also poses no tension with virtue 
ethics.  Indeed, the implementation of the Constitution’s original meaning 
emphasizes that originalism is built on human practices, thereby giving 
originalism a porosity that enables it to absorb virtue ethics’ concepts. 
Originalism’s consistency with virtue ethics is true for those versions of 
originalism that do not ground themselves in the Aristotelian philosophical 
tradition, as well as those that do.  For example, Professor Randy Barnett 
has argued that originalism is the correct interpretative methodology 
because it leads to a government that gives adequate assurances of natural 
rights protection.248  Barnett’s normative justification for originalism 
sounds in the deontological philosophical tradition.249  That tradition does 
not exclude the insights of virtue ethics, and the numerous writers in that 
tradition that have explicitly incorporated virtue ethics evidence this.250 
 
 242. See Solum, supra note 122, at 944, 954. 
 243. See id.  Constitutional law is the label for the rules of law and legal doctrines 
articulated in Supreme Court constitutional precedent. 
 244. The virtue of justice-as-lawfulness, which requires a judge to abide by the laws of 
the judge’s society, does not conflict with the fixation and contribution theses because the 
virtue does not identify what the law is to which the judge owes allegiance, while that 
identifying function is the theses’ purpose. 
 245. Of course, originalists have defended this premise. See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 113–14; 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 162–63. 
 246. See Strang, supra note 111, at 1729. 
 247. Other mechanisms include long-standing practices and institutions like stare decisis 
and the presidential cabinet. 
 248. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
supra note 7, at 45–47. 
 249. See id. at 14–15, 301–08 (distinguishing between natural law and natural rights). 
 250. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 3 (describing the increased utilization of virtue 
ethics’ insights by utilitarians and deontologists); Onora O’Neill, Kant’s Virtues, in HOW 
SHOULD ONE LIVE?, supra note 231, at 77 (providing an attempted reconciliation). 
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Originalists who are working outside of the Aristotelian tradition can 
incorporate the concept of virtue because every conception of originalism 
recognizes that humans play important roles in the practice of constitutional 
interpretation.  The most central such actor is the judge.  Judges and other 
participants in our interpretative practice can perform their roles well or 
poorly.  Virtue helps explain how and why that is the case.  It describes 
(part of) what makes, for instance, a good judge good, and a bad citizen 
bad. 
Of course, versions of originalism, such as mine, that are explicitly 
grounded on the tenets of the Aristotelian tradition, provide a ready-made 
home for virtue ethics.  In my previous writings, I argued that originalism is 
the correct interpretative methodology because it best enables members of 
our society to pursue human flourishing.251  My argument relied on the 
Aristotelian tradition’s core concept of human flourishing.252  This Article 
adds a second strand tying originalism to the Aristotelian tradition by 
showing that virtue, which facilitates human flourishing, also facilitates 
originalism. 
A common reason for the perceived incompatibility of originalism and 
virtue ethics is that originalism is purportedly a theory of rules, while virtue 
ethics eschews rules in favor of elastic concepts like character and virtue.  
Both of these perceptions reflect reality to some degree, but the conclusion 
that originalism is incompatible with virtue ethics does not. 
The perception that originalism is primarily a methodology of rules likely 
gained currency from Justice Scalia, one of the earliest prominent 
originalists.253  In his judicial254 and scholarly writings,255 Justice Scalia 
argued that originalism will regularly lead to rules as the operative legal 
norms.  The best example of this is his article, The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules.256  There, Justice Scalia argued that an originalism of rules will 
better advance the Rule of Law by, for instance, limiting judicial 
discretion.257  Nonoriginalists have focused on this claim in their criticism 
of originalism,258 and originalists too have criticized the tendency to equate 
 
 251. See Strang, supra note 22, at 982–1000. 
 252. See id.   I also previously identified situations where judges must use the judicial 
virtues to effectively perform their judicial duties.  For example, when federal judges must 
decide whether to overrule a nonoriginalist precedent, I argued that they must utilize the 
virtues of justice-as-lawfulness and practical wisdom. Strang, supra note 14, at 484–86.  
Judges must employ those virtues because their decision requires them to apply three factors, 
id. at 472, a process that is not significantly law-bounded and places great demands on the 
judges’ judgment. 
 253. Justice Scalia’s appointment to the Supreme Court in 1986 provided an early and 
prominent platform for his advocacy of originalism that he utilized in both his opinions and 
scholarly writings. 
 254. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). 
 255. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 1185. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See id. 
 258. See Jamal Greene, Heller High Water?  The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 325, 341 (2009); Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 159, 170–73 (2009). 
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originalism with legal rules.259  On the other hand, a frequent criticism 
lodged against virtue ethics is that its purported lack of normative rules 
disables it from offering sufficient ethical guidance.260 
Both of these perceptions, though rooted in reality, are not wholly 
accurate.  Originalists have moved away from Justice Scalia’s claim that 
originalism primarily produces legal rules (if originalists ever embraced the 
proposition, which is not clear to me).261  Instead, as Professor Keith 
Whittington has argued, the level of generality of operative legal norms is 
determined by the Constitution’s original meaning itself.262  On occasion, 
that meaning will be rule-like, while on other occasions, it will be 
abstract.263  Likewise, virtue theorists, while acknowledging the fuzziness 
of some of virtue ethics’ concepts, have argued that virtue ethics also 
prescribes rules of conduct.  For instance, Rosalind Hursthouse has 
described the numerous “V-rules” that virtue ethics entails.264 
Consequently, both originalism and virtue ethics produce (legal and 
ethical) rules and more abstract norms.  This conclusion, coupled with 
originalism’s new porosity to virtue ethics, discussed above,265 sets the 
stage for my argument below, that originalism should incorporate virtue 
ethics. 
B.  Virtue’s Home in Originalism 
In this section, I show some of the many ways in which concepts from 
virtue ethics contribute to a richer originalism.  First, I show that an 
originalism that takes on virtue ethics’ insights is more descriptively 
accurate.  Second, I describe the virtues’ roles at key steps in the 
interpretative process and show how virtue ethics makes originalism more 
normatively attractive.  I end by summarizing virtue ethics’ contribution to 
originalism:  it preserves originalism’s core insights, while facilitating its 
transformation. 
1.  Greater Explanatory Power 
Originalism’s incorporation of virtue ethics will make originalism more 
descriptively accurate in at least four ways:  (1) originalism will be more 
 
 259. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity:  A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” 
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 11 (2006) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s “ruleification” of 
originalism). 
 260. See, e.g., HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 35–42 (identifying and responding to this 
view). 
 261. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Two Cheers, Not Three, for Sixth Amendment 
Originalism, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 45–46 (2011) (arguing that, consistently 
applied, originalism would, in some significant number of cases, “lead[] away from bright-
line rules”). 
 262. See Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin’s “Originalism”:  The Role of Intentions in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 214 (2000). 
 263. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 184–87. 
 264. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 28–42. 
 265. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing a transformed originalism that, among other 
characteristics, acknowledges judicial discretion). 
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hospitable to and paint in a better light common practices; (2) originalism 
will be able to embrace the widespread and attractive conception of judging 
as a craft; (3) originalism will be able to emphasize the fact that 
constitutional interpretation is a human practice; and (4) originalism will 
better fit the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ plan of constitutional government 
which embraced their virtue-infused assumptions. 
Fit is a powerful argument in law.266  The more “data” of a legal practice 
that a purported “interpretation” of that practice can satisfactorily explain, 
the more powerful the theory.  A proffered interpretation of a legal practice 
that accounts for only twenty percent of the practice’s data does not fit and, 
therefore, cannot be an interpretation of that practice.  However, the 
quantity of data fit by an interpretation is only one axis upon which to 
evaluate interpretations.  Interpretations also vary on the axis of the quality 
of their fit.  For instance, some interpretations are more elegant than others; 
they may fit the data more cleanly.  The result is that one should prefer an 
interpretation that paints a practice in a better light even if that 
interpretation fits slightly less of the data than a competing interpretation. 
Currently, originalism is in tension with major facets of American 
constitutional interpretative practice.  Most prominently, critics have argued 
that originalism cannot account for the role nonoriginalist precedent plays 
in constitutional adjudication.267  Constitutional adjudication undeniably 
continues to employ nonoriginalist precedent.  This limits originalism’s 
claim to adequately describe our practice of constitutional interpretation. 
Virtue ethics helps originalism incorporate the practice of nonoriginalist 
precedent.268  It does so by ensuring that judges who face nonoriginalist 
precedent will still regard themselves as bound by the Constitution’s 
original meaning, and therefore nonoriginalist precedent will not erode the 
original meaning’s pride-of-place.  A judge with the virtue of justice-as-
lawfulness will seek to give the Constitution’s original meaning its full due.  
Therefore, a virtuous judge will refrain from overruling or limiting a 
nonoriginalist precedent only for good reasons.269  Accepting the continued 
viability of some nonoriginalist precedent will not, therefore, undermine 
originalism, and originalism can more easily fit this facet of our legal 
practice. 
More important, originalism’s picture of practices, such as nonoriginalist 
precedent, will also be more attractive because it will have the tools to 
explain how to make judges engaging in the practices the best they can be.  
Judges’ decisions on whether and to what extent to overrule or limit a 
nonoriginalist precedent will frequently be hard.  Judges have to evaluate 
and weigh a number of factors, each of which has a hard-to-quantify 
 
 266. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 230 (1986). 
 267. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 15–17 (2001). 
 268. Although I focus my arguments on the practice of nonoriginalist precedent, my 
analysis applies as well to constitutional construction, originalist precedent, and the 
articulation and application of the original meaning. 
 269. See Strang, supra note 14, at 472 (describing the criteria a judge should consider, to 
refrain from overruling nonoriginalist precedent). 
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weight.  An originalism that incorporates the lessons of virtue ethics can 
show how judges faced with those difficult choices can make the best 
determinations, all things considered.   For example, a judge with practical 
wisdom will, by definition, have the best insight into the extent to which 
overruling a nonoriginalist precedent would harm Rule of Law values. 
Relatedly, an originalism that incorporates concepts from virtue ethics 
will produce the judges most capable of accurately evaluating nonoriginalist 
precedent because originalism will have the tools to identify and/or educate 
judges best suited to the practice.  For example, originalism will have the 
resources to suggest that potential judges “acquire judicial intelligence, 
integrity, and wisdom” from “train[ing] in the law [and] experience [in] 
legal practice.”270  With its ability to identify, inculcate, and select for 
virtuous judges, originalism will produce better results. 
Second, once originalism has incorporated virtue ethics’ insights, it will 
also fit the widespread judging-as-craft account of judging.271  The core 
insight of this account is that judges are participants in a human practice 
with internal standards,272 and that, to be excellent in the craft, a judge must 
master those standards.  Hence, some judges, more than others, are 
excellent writers, construct elegant analyses of the law, powerfully 
articulate the law’s meaning and import, possess a judicial disposition, and 
so on. 
Virtue ethics helps originalism incorporate this judging-as-craft account 
of judging.  Originalism can emphasize, for instance, the theoretical 
wisdom a judge needs in order to fashion a persuasive presentation of the 
Constitution’s original meaning. 
Third, giving virtue a place in originalism emphasizes, in a way that is 
often missed, the key fact that constitutional interpretation is a human 
practice.273  Virtue helps originalism explain that law is a process, with 
human actors at each critical step in the process.  Law begins when an 
authorized person or group of people identifies a problem they believe is 
susceptible to legal solution.  These legislators craft a law, the goal of 
which is to re-order society to solve identified problems.  The executive 
branch enforces the law.  In some instances, enforcement requires judicial 
resolution on whether, to what extent, and how the law applies to discrete 
parties.  Lastly, citizens governed by the law internalize the law and act 
according to its dictates. 
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THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:  DECIDING APPEALS (1960); and THE ART AND CRAFT OF 
JUDGING:  THE DECISIONS OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND (Herschel Shanks ed., 1968).  
 272. Cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 129, at 187–91 (describing his earlier conception of 
virtues internal to human practices). 
 273. See Horwitz, supra note 67, at 106–07 (describing a return to the human-
centeredness of legal practice). 
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At each step in the process of law, human actors will perform their roles 
more or less well depending upon whether they possess the requisite 
virtues.  The virtues I described above are key to describing and evaluating 
the performance of these human participants.  Below, I describe in detail the 
virtues required for judges to articulate the Constitution’s original meaning 
and apply that meaning in cases. 
Fourth, originalism, bolstered by virtue ethics, better fits the historical 
record surrounding the Framing and Ratification and therefore the 
Constitution itself.  The Framers and Ratifiers believed in virtue ethics and 
relied on that belief when constructing the Constitution.274  Historical and 
legal scholarship, though differing on the degree to which virtue ethics was 
part of the intellectual climate during the Framing and Ratification, 
generally agrees with my modest claim that, among other intellectual 
commitments, the Framers and Ratifiers believed in virtue ethics and relied 
on that belief when constructing the Constitution.275 
Perhaps the clearest instance of this is James Madison’s observation, in 
Federalist 57, that 
[t]he aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first, to obtain 
for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to 
pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the 
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue 
to hold their public trust.276 
This conception of representation, which was a premise of the 
Constitution’s structure of representation,277 incorporated virtue ethics.278 
Originalism, once it has embraced virtue ethics, has a greater ability to 
appreciate this historical fact.  Originalism can, for instance, acknowledge 
 
 274. The literature on the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ intellectual commitments is vast and 
conflicted. See generally Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism:  The Career of a Concept, 79 J. 
AM. HIST. 11 (1992) (describing the intellectual history of scholarly views on the Framing 
and Ratification period).  The foundational sources for the proposition that a commitment to 
virtue ethics was at least one dominant current during the Framing and Ratification are 
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A. 
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); and GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC:  1776–1787 (1969).  These sources generated a “Republican 
Revival” in legal scholarship in the mid-1980s to early 1990s. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, 
Forward:  Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
 275. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 274, at 38–45 (describing the role of virtue in the 
Federalists’ conception of representation and structures of representation). 
 276. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 316 (James Madison) (George Stade, ed. 2006). 
 277. For instance, the President is elected by electors. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see 
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 276, at 375,  (John Jay) (“As the select assemblies 
for choosing the President . . . will, in general, be composed of the most enlightened and 
respectable citizens, there is reason to presume, that their attention and their votes will be 
directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and 
virtue.”). 
 278. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 276, at 288 (James Madison) (“If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, neither external 
nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”). 
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and utilize the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ virtue-based concepts and 
assumptions when articulating the Constitution’s original meaning.279 
2.  Virtue’s Home in Originalism 
For each of the following facets of originalist constitutional 
interpretation, I describe how virtue ethics provides the tools originalism 
needs to make originalism the best it can be.  The virtues’ roles fall into two 
categories:  first, where judges exercise discretion; and second, where 
ascertaining and applying the Constitution’s determinate original meaning 
places significant burdens on judges’ faculties.  The first category occurs 
primarily in the contexts of nonoriginalist precedent and constitutional 
construction, while the second takes place in the contexts of originalist 
precedent and articulating and applying the original meaning. 
The key contribution virtue ethics makes in each instance is that the 
virtues enable judges to give the original meaning its due, while also giving 
other interpretative factors their due, all in their proper proportion.  Virtue 
ethics facilitates originalism’s transformation because the virtues preserve 
originalism as a viable interpretative methodology by preventing the 
transformative admission of judicial discretion from cannibalizing the rest 
of the theory.  I explain this further at the end of this Article. 
a.  Virtue’s Role when Judges Exercise Discretion:  
Nonoriginalist Precedent and Constitutional Construction 
In this section, I describe the various ways the judicial virtues operate 
when judges possess discretion.  The two main instances of this are the 
contexts of nonoriginalist precedent and constitutional construction. 
Nonoriginalist precedent is precedent that incorrectly articulated and/or 
applied the Constitution’s original meaning.280  Large swaths of American 
constitutional law are populated or, in some cases, dominated by 
nonoriginalist precedent.281  Nonoriginalists have argued that originalism is 
fatally flawed by this fact because:  either originalism will eliminate all 
nonoriginalist precedent, in which case originalism will be too destabilizing 
to Rule of Law values; or, originalism will overrule some but not all 
 
 279. A possible example of this is the issue of nonoriginalist precedent.  If the Framers 
and Ratifiers employed the concept of virtue when drafting and ratifying “judicial Power,” 
then the original meaning of “judicial Power” is more likely to include a place for 
nonoriginalist precedent, than if they did not assume judges would utilize the judicial virtues.  
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 276, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing how 
Article III tenure protection was necessary to induce excellent lawyers to become federal 
judges because of the “very considerable bulk” of precedent such judges would have to 
master). 
 280. In a recent article, I described in detail the standard of “originalism in good faith” to 
distinguish originalist from nonoriginalist precedent. Strang, supra note 111, at 1739–52. 
 281. See Strang, supra note 14, at 430–31. 
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nonoriginalist precedent, which will then give judges tremendous discretion 
and similarly undermine Rule of Law values.282 
Some originalists, including myself, have argued that federal judges are 
constitutionally required by Article III to give constitutional precedent, 
including nonoriginalist precedent, significant respect.283  In particular, a 
judge must utilize three factors to decide whether to overrule a 
nonoriginalist precedent:  (1) the extent of the precedent’s deviation from 
the Constitution’s original meaning; (2) the harm to Rule of Law values 
caused by overruling the precedent; and (3) the extent to which the 
precedent creates a just social ordering.284  However, this opens originalism 
to the second nonoriginalist criticism:  that originalism gives judges too 
much discretion.  Virtue ethics enables originalism to adequately address 
this critique. 
Originalists can argue that a judge with the judicial virtues will 
appropriately evaluate the three factors and come to the correct 
conclusion—the conclusion that gives the Constitution’s original meaning 
its due regard while, at the same time, taking into account other important 
values, such as stability.  First, the virtuous judge will possess the virtue of 
theoretical wisdom, which will enable the judge to accurately ascertain the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  For instance, when faced with a case that 
requires a judge to ascertain the Commerce Clause’s meaning, this virtue 
will permit the judge to perform the necessary research into the historical 
data.285  The judge will also review pertinent originalist precedent.286  
Then, the judge will synthesize those legal materials into the authoritative 
constitutional meaning.  At the same time, the judge will ascertain the 
meaning of the nonoriginalist precedent in question.287 
Second, a judge with the virtue of justice-as-lawfulness has the 
disposition to give the Constitution’s original meaning, and binding 
originalist precedent, its due regard:  to treat it as controlling.  This means, 
among other things, that the virtuous judge will be inclined to overrule 
nonoriginalist precedent, especially precedent that deviates greatly from the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  For example, Wickard v. Filburn 
pronounced what has become known as the substantial effects test.288  
Wickard is a nonoriginalist precedent because it incorrectly articulated the 
 
 282. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking 
and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 132 (1991). 
 283. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 102, at 806; Strang, supra note 14, at 420.   
Even originalists, like Professor Barnett, who advocate overruling all nonoriginalist 
precedent, seem to hedge on this point. See Barnett, supra note 110, at 266 (“[I]n my view, a 
commitment to original meaning over precedent does not entail a commitment to rejecting 
properly tailored reliance claims by individual citizens.”). 
 284. See Strang, supra note 14, at 472. 
 285. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, 
supra note 7, at 274–318 (engaging in this inquiry). 
 286. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 
1387, 1408–22 (1987) (evaluating pre-New Deal Commerce Clause case law). 
 287. See id. at 1443–54. 
 288. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942). 
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Commerce Clause’s original meaning.289  Coming to this conclusion will 
incline the virtuous judge to overrule Wickard. 
Third, the virtuous judge will utilize the virtue of practical wisdom to 
ascertain the extent of harm to Rule of Law values (if any) that the judge 
would cause if he overruled a precedent.  This will frequently be a difficult 
task.  For instance, in evaluating whether to overrule (or limit) Wickard, the 
judge faces the daunting challenge of calculating the reliance interests built 
on Wickard; for instance, in the form of numerous federal statutes premised 
on the substantial effects test.290 
Additionally, practical wisdom empowers a judge to articulate legal 
doctrine that will accurately connect the Constitution’s meaning to the facts 
presented by a case.  In the context of nonoriginalist precedent, this will 
frequently be a challenging task if the judge determines not to overrule the 
precedent but, instead, to limit it.  The judge will then have to modify 
existing (nonoriginalist) doctrine in a way that moves constitutional law 
toward the original meaning, while at the same time ensuring that the 
doctrine is as coherent as possible.  The challenge to doctrinal coherence is 
caused by the dichotomous commitments made by the hypothetical 
doctrine:  on the one hand, the nonoriginalist precedent remains viable, 
pulling the doctrine in one direction; and on the other hand, the original 
meaning pulls the doctrine in another direction.  Practical wisdom gives a 
judge the ability to make the best of this difficult—though very common—
situation. 
This was arguably the situation faced by the Justices inclined to limit 
Wickard in United States v. Lopez.291  Wickard’s substantial effects test, the 
majority acknowledged, could justify upholding the challenged law.292  To 
preserve—and limit—Wickard, while at the same time moving the Court’s 
Commerce Clause case law toward the original meaning, the majority 
articulated the commercial/noncommercial distinction as an added limit to 
Wickard’s reach.293 
Fourth, in evaluating whether the nonoriginalist precedent in question 
creates a just ordering, a judge must utilize the virtue of justice-as-
fairness.294  While the virtue of justice-as-lawfulness inclines the judge 
 
 289. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, 
supra note 7, at 315 (criticizing Wickard’s departure from the original meaning). 
 290. See Strang, supra note 14, at 445–46. 
 291. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 292. See id. at 563–68. 
 293. See id. 
 294. In addition to justice-as-lawfulness, described in the text, Aristotle also described a 
narrower manifestation of justice:  justice as equality, or justice-as-fairness. See ARISTOTLE, 
supra note 187, at 1129b.  Justice-as-fairness is giving each individual his due without 
giving the pertinent legal norm dispositive weight.  Scholars often employ the label 
“general” justice for justice-as-lawfulness, and “particular” justice for justice-as-equality. 
See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 143, AT 130 n.e (“‘General’ is the more convenient qualifier 
because Aquinas, following Aristotle, divides justice into ‘general’ (‘legal’) and ‘particular’ 
(or ‘special’).”); KRAUT, supra note 187, at 102 n.6 (“Many scholars call justice as 
lawfulness ‘universal’ or ‘general’ justice, and justice as equality ‘particular’ or ‘special’ 
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toward overruling the nonoriginalist precedent—because of its illegality—
the virtue of justice-as-fairness enables the judge to determine whether the 
precedent otherwise—that is, despite its inconsistency with the original 
meaning—properly orders relations. 
Again, taking a constitutional challenge to Wickard as our example, the 
virtuous judge will decide whether the increased scope to Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority increases or decreases just relationships.  One 
place where this inquiry has bite is the federal antidiscrimination laws that 
are premised on Wickard’s expansive reading of the Commerce Clause.  
Would overruling Wickard cause the demise of the Civil Rights Act, which 
helped eliminate one form of unjust ordering?295 
Each of the decisions made by a judge in the process of evaluating the 
continued vitality of a nonoriginalist precedent is augmented by a virtue.  
Having these virtues, by hypothesis, makes it more likely that these 
decisions are the best they can be.  Therefore, although a judge has 
discretion, that discretion does not undermine the originalist project because 
the Constitution’s original meaning is given pride-of-place, consistent with 
other values.  Indeed, the virtuous judge’s discretion provides the 
opportunity to arrive at the best (humanly possible) decision, all things 
considered.  The virtuous judge will not be the perfect judge, however, and 
this is especially true when the burdens on the judge’s capacities are at their 
highest; for instance, in determining harm to Rule of Law values. 
Constitutional construction is another part of originalism that explicitly 
acknowledges judicial discretion.  As with nonoriginalist precedent, 
originalism augmented by virtue ethics can incorporate the concept of 
construction without undermining originalism.  This is because a judge who 
possesses the judicial virtues will, so far as possible, respect the 
Constitution’s original meaning and, by hypothesis, construct the best 
constitutional meaning within the original meaning’s parameters. 
As I described above,296 constitutional construction occurs when the 
Constitution’s meaning is underdetermined.  That is, using his best efforts, 
a judge is unable to conclude that the Constitution provides one right 
answer to a legal question.297  In other words, the Constitution’s meaning 
limits possible answers to a legal question, but it does not designate one 
answer as uniquely correct.  Judges, in the context of constitutional 
 
justice.”); see also Strang, supra note 14, at 477–78 (describing this concept in greater 
detail). 
 295. This determination, in turn, involves a significant number of subsidiary 
determinations that require practical wisdom for their proper resolution:  Are there other 
plausible constitutional bases for the Act?  Do state and local antidiscrimination laws 
adequately ensure just relationships in the absence of federal law?  Are popular mores such 
that federal antidiscrimination laws are no longer necessary?  Are federal antidiscrimination 
laws themselves sufficiently harmful in their collateral consequences that their elimination 
is, on balance, good? 
 296. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 297. In all situations of which I am aware, the Constitution has some meaning that bears 
on the point and therefore provides some guidance, so the original meaning is 
underdetermined and not indeterminate. 
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construction are, therefore, left with a choice.  Judges must choose one of 
the answers that is consistent with, but not determined by, the Constitution. 
As with nonoriginalist precedent, the judicial virtues of theoretical 
wisdom and justice-as-lawfulness will enable the virtuous judge to correctly 
decide what the original meaning is, allow the judge to recognize that the 
original meaning does not determine the outcome of the case, and give the 
judge the disposition to follow, so far as possible, that original meaning.  
These virtues prevent the judge from seeing underdeterminacy when the 
original meaning is determinate.  This preserves the original meaning’s 
primacy in constitutional interpretation. 
Practical wisdom, unlike in the context of nonoriginalist precedent, 
performs on a significantly more “open field” here.  In the nonoriginalist 
precedent context, the judge’s practical wisdom is limited to the task of 
ascertaining whether and to what extent overruling would harm the Rule of 
Law.  That is frequently a difficult task, though it is focused.  By contrast 
here, within the known original meaning, the judge’s task is to play the 
legislative role of constructing constitutional meaning that will best advance 
the common good.  All of the variables that a legislator would take into 
account, the judge should also utilize.  By contrast, constitutional 
interpretation, discussed below, does not place as significant a burden on 
judges’ practical wisdom because the original meaning determines those 
cases’ outcomes. 
b.  Virtue’s Place in Determinate Law:  Constitutional Interpretation 
and Originalist Precedent 
In this section, I spell out how virtue ethics makes originalism a better 
theory even in those many situations where, unlike above, judicial decisions 
are constrained by the original meaning.  The common theme here is that 
there are hard cases that place significant burdens on judges’ faculties, and 
that to bear those burdens well, judges need the judicial virtues. 
The core process of constitutional interpretation includes both 
articulating the Constitution’s meaning and applying that meaning in the 
context of a case.298  Constitutional interpretation differs from construction 
(and nonoriginalist precedent) because, unlike with construction, judges do 
not have discretion.  Consequently, the virtues’ roles are different, though 
still significant. 
Constitutional interpretation occurs when the Constitution’s determinate 
meaning is explicated.  In originalism, constitutional meaning is the 
constitutional text’s publicly understood meaning when that text was 
ratified.  One identifies the Constitution’s original meaning by looking at 
the text and structure of the Constitution in light of the historical, cultural, 
religious, and philosophical contexts in which the text was adopted.  This is 
primarily an historical inquiry. 
 
 298. Compare Strang, supra note 111, at 1767–78, with Solum, supra note 101, at 95, 
100–08 (describing these two stages in a different manner). 
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A judge engaged in constitutional interpretation will need the intellectual 
virtue of theoretical wisdom.  The need for theoretical wisdom will vary 
depending on, among other variables, how patent the text’s original 
meaning is.  In some situations, this is a difficult task.  A possible example 
of this is the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.  Although there are 
extensive discussions of the Clause in the Reconstruction Congress, the 
Clause’s original meaning is relatively difficult to reconstruct.299 
As with other facets of originalism, judges will also need the moral virtue 
of justice-as-lawfulness.  This ensures that the judges follow the original 
meaning. 
A judge will utilize practical wisdom to bridge the distance between the 
Constitution’s original meaning and the facts of a case.  The larger the 
distance, the greater the burden practical wisdom must carry.  For instance, 
in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court faced the challenge of 
articulating constitutional doctrine that, faithful to the Commerce Clause’s 
original meaning, specified300 how that meaning governed a changing 
economy and society.  In particular, the challenge included properly 
mediating the Clause’s application to new or newly common phenomena.  
The Court met this challenge by articulating a number of constitutional law 
doctrines. 
The original packages doctrine is one such doctrinal move.  In a series of 
cases, beginning in 1827 with Brown v. Maryland,301 the Supreme Court 
fashioned the doctrine to mediate two constitutional commitments:  (1) 
Congress’s authority over interstate commerce; and (2) the states’ reserved 
police power over in-state commercial transactions.  The doctrine’s function 
was to find a doctrinal line that accomplished this purpose and fit the facts 
of the world. 
For example, in Austin v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court decided whether 
the doctrine applied to cigarettes imported from other states in relatively 
small packages.302  To reach its conclusion, the Court reviewed the 
doctrine’s seventy-year history, and how the doctrine advanced its purpose 
of mediating between the constitutional commitments identified above.303  
 
 299. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW:  FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 140–41 (1986) (“There was clearly 
vagueness and some confusion in the minds of the framers about the actual language of the 
amendment and its relationship to the original Constitution.”); REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, 
ENFORCING EQUALITY:  CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS 56 (2006) (“The record is less clear [than the 1866 Civil Rights Act] with regard to 
which substantive rights [were] encompassed in the broadly worded provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1397 (1992) (“Indeed, I hesitate to attribute to most participants 
in the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment any precise notion of the 
meaning of Section 1.”); Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection—A History of 
Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 540 (1985) (finding that the historical “evidence . . . is 
not entirely consistent” or is “simply ambiguous”). 
 300. See Strang, supra note 111, at 1767–78 (describing the process of specification). 
 301. See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827). 
 302. See 179 U.S. 343, 350 (1900). 
 303. See id. at 351–63. 
2012] ORIGINALISM AND THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION 2039 
In many of the original packages doctrine cases, the Court engaged in 
similar line drawing.  Practical wisdom facilitated this. 
Originalist precedent is one—particularly important—facet of 
constitutional interpretation, where judges do not have discretion.  To 
properly understand, synthesize, follow, and apply originalist precedent, a 
judge will need theoretical wisdom, justice-as-lawfulness, and practical 
wisdom. 
Using the pre-New Deal Commerce Clause case law as an example, the 
Supreme Court had crafted a number of interrelated doctrines that formed a 
complex body of law.  These included:  the original packages doctrine,304 
mentioned above, the instrumentalities of commerce doctrine,305 the 
streams of commerce doctrine,306 the doctrinal distinction between 
commerce and manufacturing,307 and the related doctrinal distinction 
between direct and indirect effects.308  These doctrines represented the 
Court’s attempt to follow the twin constitutional commitments to federal 
commerce power and state police power.309  To master this intricate body 
of law, a judge would have needed theoretical wisdom, and to have 
followed it faithfully would have required justice-as-lawfulness. 
3.  Originalism Transformed into a Home for Virtue 
Incorporating virtue ethics into originalism makes originalism’s 
transformation possible.  Originalists can embrace the discretion wielded by 
judges as a result of originalism’s response to legal-realist-type criticism 
because virtue ethics provides the tools to show that originalism’s core 
insights remain intact.  The Constitution’s original meaning retains its 
privileged position because of justice-as-lawfulness, which inclines judges 
to follow it, and theoretical wisdom helps judges accurately ascertain the 
original meaning. 
In those situations where judges wield discretion, practical wisdom, and 
the moral virtues of temperance and fortitude, ensure that judges reach the 
humanly best result within the scope of the judge’s discretion.  When 
judges do not have discretion, the virtues ensure that judges construct the 
best legal doctrines. 
 
 304. See Brown, 25 U.S. at 441–42; supra note 183 and accompanying text.  
 305. See Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351–52 (1914); supra note 184 and 
accompanying text. 
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 308. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546–48 (1935). 
 309. See E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 13 (“It is vital that the independence of the 
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CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I explained the many ways in which concepts from virtue 
ethics are, contrary to popular perception, compatible with an originalist 
theory of constitutional interpretation.  More important, I showed that 
originalism is more normatively attractive and descriptively accurate when 
it takes on board virtue ethics’ insights. 
Originalism has transformed over the past thirty years in response to 
legal-realist-type criticisms.  Most importantly, originalism has come to 
acknowledge judicial discretion in constitutional adjudication.  An 
originalism that incorporates the lessons of virtue ethics, however, is able to 
simultaneously preserve originalism as a viable theory of constitutional 
interpretation while, at the same time, continuing to acknowledge judicial 
discretion.  Virtue ethics enables originalist judges to effectively interpret 
and put into practice the Constitution’s original meaning despite and, in 
part, because of this judicial discretion. 
Similarly, incorporating virtue ethics will make originalism a stronger 
interpretive method in those contexts where, even though the original 
meaning provides a determinate answer, the case places significant burdens 
on the judge’s judgment.  In this class of cases—neither the easy cases nor 
those that are underdeterminate—virtue ethics provides the means to 
explain how judges can best decide. 
An originalism that incorporates virtue ethics’ insights will give the 
Constitution’s original meaning its due.  At the same time, it also gives 
other factors—such as the practical workability of legal doctrine—their due, 
all in their proper proportion.  For originalists, and for nonoriginalists who 
value the Constitution’s original meaning, this preserves originalism’s core 
insights and value, while enabling originalism’s transformation. 
 
